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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTHCARE
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Major Department: Economics
India accounts for two-thirds of global maternal deaths and the highest number
of infant deaths annually. Given the poor performance of maternal and infant healthcare
service indicators, India launched two maternal health programs- a conditional cash transfer
program called Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY) in 2005 and a free services program called
Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakaram (JSSK) in 2011. The programs aim to reduce maternal
and infant mortality through the promotion of public institutional delivery. Both provide
financial incentives to pregnant women through a reduced price effect on delivery care. Using
the Indian District Household Surveys, I exploit the differences in individual eligibility rules
across states to estimate the impact of the programs on healthcare utilization and measures of
infant mortality. The results suggest that JSY and JSSK reduced home births and increased
the use of public institutional care. While JSY also shifted women away from private to public
facilities, JSSK increased the use of private care. I also find evidence that JSY reduces fetal
and perinatal mortality but does not impact higher days mortality rates. Further, the spread
of information about healthier pregnancies by health facilitators under the programs increases
the use of antenatal services. On the one hand, JSY reduces the probability of women going

back for a postpartum checkup, and on the other, free maternal care services with zero
postpartum care costs under JSSK increase their likelihood to return for a checkup. Also,
I find heterogeneity in programs’ impact with more educated and poorer women benefiting
the most from them.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Maternal and Child Healthcare
More than 2.8 million pregnant women and newborns die annually worldwide. India
accounts for one-fifth of the total deaths. Access to maternal care would make most of
these deaths preventable (WHO et al., 2019). A lack of maternal care also increases the
incidence of chronic diseases and has socioeconomic consequences for households and
society alike (Reed et al., 2000; Carroli et al., 2001; Gray et al., 2006). Studies have
identified the lack of financial resources as a primary factor for women to forgo healthcare
services (Ensor and Cooper, 2004a; Bhatia and Gorter, 2007). Governments aim to
increase the demand for maternal and child healthcare services by increasing the
purchasing power of low-income groups (Kruk et al., 2007; Elmusharaf et al., 2015). In this
paper, I evaluate the impact of financial incentives provided under two large-scale maternal
healthcare programs in India on women’s healthcare behavior.
In 2005, India launched Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY) to incentivize women through a
conditional cash transfer (CCT) to utilize public institutional delivery. JSY aims to reduce
maternal and infant mortality by integrating cash assistance with delivery care. In 2011,
India launched a free services program called Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakaram (JSSK).
JSSK eliminates out of pocket expenditures for pregnant women and aims to further
improve institutional delivery and provide comprehensive care at zero cost. Using
information from different administrative surveys, I study the programs’ impacts on the
utilization of institutional delivery and other maternal services and child mortality. The
identification strategy relies on variations in individual’s program eligibility rules across
1

states and time to study its effect using a difference-in-differences model. Additionally, I
evaluate the impact of JSY eligibility on women’s pregnancy timing using a discrete-time
hazard model.
Research studies on financial assistance for maternal care carried out in several
countries have produced mixed results. Cash transfer programs in El Salvador and
Honduras increase institutional deliveries; however, they only improve the coverage of
antenatal care and child check-ups in Honduras (Morris et al., 2004; De Brauw et al.,
2011). Studies on the abolition of user fees for maternal services in Ghana report
conflicting estimates on skilled birth care (Dzakpasu et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2015).
The use of healthcare vouchers to increase purchasing power in countries including
Pakistan and Bangladesh result in a significant increase in institutional delivery (Schmidt
et al., 2010; Agha, 2011).
The evidence from the literature for India suggests that financial incentives increase
the quantity demanded of targeted maternal health services. However, many studies’
definitions of treatment groups are questionable. Moreover, the literature lacks definitive
evidence demonstrating the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviors.
Estimating the effect on the use of complementary health services is important because
comprehensive healthcare services, and not any singled out service, best promote maternal
and child health.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature on maternal and child healthcare in
four ways. First, as per my knowledge, this paper provides novel evidence on the impact of
JSY on a wide range of health outcomes using all the components of JSY eligibility. Nearly
2

all previous researchers have overlooked the expanding healthcare infrastructure in the
country concurrent with the implementation of JSY. I use healthcare supply variables from
various data sources to eliminate the confounding impact of supply changes on the
outcomes. Second, this is the first paper to study the impact of JSY eligibility on women’s
pregnancy timing. Third, it is the first paper to study the impact of JSSK on utilization of
healthcare services and child health outcomes. Fourth, I add to the extensive literature on
demand-side financing maternal healthcare programs.
I hypothesize that cash transfers under JSY and free maternal healthcare services
under JSSK change the relative prices of different healthcare-seeking options and alter
women’s decisions. From Chapter 1 on JSY, the results suggest that the program increases
the utilization of public institutional delivery among eligible women by 23 percent. The
increase comes from shifts away from home and private institutions. The decline in the use
of private facilities is substantially larger than the decline in home births. JSY increases
the use of any antenatal services by 5.4 percent, with first-trimester doctor visits up by 22
percent among eligible women. Unlike its positive impact on all the other healthcare
utilization outcomes, JSY reduces eligible women’s postpartum check-ups by 17.2 percent.
Although the result seems counter-intuitive, I postulate that the free immediate care
received at the health facility leads to women substituting expensive postpartum check-ups
with the care received at the health facility.
The presence of immediate care at institutions reduces the risk of complications
during childbirth, thus reducing stillbirths. JSY reduces the incidence of stillbirths among
full-term births by 1.06 more live births per 1000 pregnancies. The program, however, does
3

not impact one-week and one-month mortality of newborns. Failure to counsel women
postpartum under JSY may explain the program’s ineffectiveness in reducing child
mortality.
In Chapter 2 on JSSK, the results suggest that the free maternal healthcare program
increases the utilization of delivery services at public healthcare facilities by JSY-eligible
women. Unlike JSY, this increase is accompanied by an increase in the use of private
healthcare. Wealthier women, utilizing public facilities, now shift to private providers with
an increased demand for public institutions. This is due to the overcrowding of public
health facilities as a result of their increased demand. Further, with zero cost of postnatal
services under JSSK, the free services program increases the use of postnatal care.
In Chapter 3, I study whether JSY influences women’s decisions regarding pregnancy.
I find that the eligibility criteria increases the probability of postponing the first birth to at
least 19 years of age. Since pregnancy-related complications are the main cause of death
among teenage girls, my results suggest that JSY might impact teen maternal mortality.
The dissertation continues in four subsequent sections. The first chapter studies the
effect of conditional cash transfers under JSY on women’s delivery decisions, use of
auxiliary maternal healthcare services and child mortality. In the second chapter, I study
the effects of free maternal healthcare services on JSY-eligible population. In the third
chapter, I present the analysis of the impact of JSY eligibility on woman’s age at first
birth. The last chapter discusses policy implications and concludes the dissertation.

4

CHAPTER 2
Conditional Cash Transfers and Maternal and Child Healthcare
2.1 Healthcare Landscape in India

In India, the national government acts as the primary provider of all healthcare services. A
three-tier design with sub-centres (SCs) and primary health centers (PHCs) in villages at
the lowest tier provide the first point of contact for individuals entering the healthcare
system. Community health centers (CHCs) at the district level provide the next stage of
care, and full-scale sub-district and district hospitals at the regional-level deal with the
most serious problems (Figure 2.1). As of 2019, there are more than 200,000 PHCs and
SCs in the country; a significant increase from 13,000 centers in 2004-05. Although each
PHC covers an average radial distance of 3.78 miles, only 72 percent of them are equipped
with a labor room (MoHFW, 2019). This suggests that India has an extensive but poorly
supported health infrastructure.
Despite the growth in health infrastructure, access to healthcare services remains low.
Around 57 percent of the rural population cannot afford healthcare services and treat
themselves without any medical advice (MOSPI, 2019). Among all types of health services,
maternal and child health services are the least demanded. Factors such as low levels of
female literacy, the practice of early marriage and childbearing, and strong patriarchal
norms further restrict women’s access (Horton, 2010). More than 45 percent of women
state financial constraints and lack of facilities as the primary reasons for not utilizing
services during pregnancy (DLHS, III).

5

Figure 2.1 Health Infrastructure in India

Source: Human resources for health (2011). National Rural Health Mission,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.

In the literature, ‘good care’ during pregnancy usually refers to adequate female
health providers with good interpersonal behavior, emotional support to new mothers,
counselling and competence. However, in developing countries, the issues defining ‘good
care’ run deeper. Basic issues like lack of accessibility to institutions, affordability,
cleanliness of the place of delivery, availability of trained medical personnel and medicine in
case of complications and for pain management are the major deterrents for women seeking

6

formal maternal care. Due to the lack of ‘good care’, only 77 percent of all pregnancies
reported end with a live birth (including spontaneous and induced abortions)(DLHS, III).
It also leads to a high chance of a stillbirth during delivery. India has the highest number
of stillbirths in the world with around 35.1 stillborn per 1000 births.
India also experiences inequality in the utilization of maternal health services. In
2005, only 13 percent of pregnant women in the poorest population quintile delivered in
health facilities, as compared with 84 percent in the richest population quintile (IIPS,
2006). Although the gap has reduced over time and overall skilled birth attendance has
increased, women in lowest quintile are still 32 percent less likely to deliver in health
facilities (IIPS, 2017). The disparity is widespread across geographies; a few Indian states
perform worse than Sub-Saharan African countries on maternal health indicators.
Over time, the government has reacted to the situation by developing different
programs for increasing the supply and demand for maternal services. On the supply-side,
huge investments in infrastructure are made for construction of new healthcare centers as
well as mother and child wings in community hospitals (Figure 2.2). Working on
demand-side programs, local government agencies have introduced interventions involving
the transfer of resources to disadvantaged women. These aim to increase the purchasing
power of target households and the bargaining power of women within these households
(Ensor and Cooper, 2004b). India launched the National Rural Health Mission in 2005 to
provide accessible, affordable and quality healthcare to its rural sections, especially their
vulnerable populations.

7

Figure 2.2 Intensity of Healthcare Centres- 2005 (left) and 2010 (right)

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II and DLHS III
Notes: Healthcare centers include PHCs, SCs and CHCs. The growth in the number
of centers is illustrated by yellow (lowest) to green (highest). The missing districts
in the survey are white in color.

2.1.1 Janani Suraksha Yojana
Launched under the National Rural Health Mission in 2005, Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)
integrates cash assistance with delivery care. The program provides financial incentives to
pregnant women, encouraging them to deliver in health facilities through CCTs. JSY is
one of the largest financial incentives based programs in the world (Lim et al., 2010). It
targets to increase the demand for safe pregnancy and delivery services with the overall
goal of reducing maternal and child mortality and morbidity. The program has a very
8

specific approach and provides a cash transfer conditioned on women delivering only in
public health facilities.
With more than half of the births taking place at home (in 2005), JSY aims to
introduce women to formal healthcare services through facilitators called Accredited Social
Health Activists (ASHAs). The program recruits and trains ASHAs to work within their
communities as health workers and educators to increase the use of formal healthcare
services. Although ASHAs lack medical training to provide comprehensive maternal and
child care, they are pivotal to the success of the program. ASHAs hold various
responsibilities including identifying, registering and tracking pregnancies in their local
areas. They also counsel women to seek healthcare services during pregnancy and provide
information about local healthcare facilities.
India accounts for a substantial proportion of the world’s maternal and child mortality
(Kassebaum et al., 2013). The country averages for maternal healthcare indicators,
however, mask the enormous differences across its states. For example, Kerala has a
maternal mortality rate of 46 per 100,000 pregnancies, while states such as Orissa and
Uttar Pradesh perform worse than the least developed countries with maternal mortality
ratios falling between 190 and 220. Given these disparities, JSY focuses intensively on
states with the poorest health indicators. Thus, JSY set different eligibility rules for
different states. India designates ten states as low-performing (LP) and the remaining 25
as high performing (HP) based on their performance on various socioeconomic indicators.
The states of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Assam, Rajasthan, Orissa, and Jammu and Kashmir are the LP states.
9

In the LP states, all women, irrespective of their background characteristics, are
eligible for a conditional cash transfer under the program. To be eligible for cash benefits
in the HP states, women must be at least 19 years, and possess a below poverty line (BPL)
card, or belong to Scheduled Caste (SC) / Scheduled Tribe (ST)1 . The cash assistance is
limited to up to two births in the HP states (Table A2). By restricting the age of
participation above 19 years and the number of children to at most two, JSY intends to
reduce number of births and the incidence of early motherhood.
The cash amount given under the program varies by state and area of residence.
Specifically, women in the LP states are offered Rs 1400 ($31) in rural areas and Rs 1000
($22) in urban areas for delivery in public health facilities. Those in HP states receive Rs
700 ($16) in rural areas and Rs 600 ($13) in urban areas (Table A3). The program
stipulates that cash be disbursed to the mother immediately at the institution itself or
within a week of delivery.
It is important to note that the out of pocket expenses associated with an
institutional delivery exceed the modest incentive provided under JSY. The payments only
cover between 22 to 50 percent of the total costs of a public health facility delivery
(Rahman and Pallikadavath, 2018). These cash payments are more akin to price reductions
for delivery cost as compared to some extra cash income guaranteed under the program.
Although JSY incentives provide partial financial risk-protection, it may trigger exposure
to additional costs of ancillary services like referrals and transport services (Prinja et al.,
1

In 2013, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare relaxed the eligibility parameters for JSY. With
the changes, women can now access JSY cash benefits irrespective of their age at first birth and number of
children.
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2015; Randive et al., 2013).
For their pivotal role in facilitating institutional delivery, ASHAs are also offered
performance-based cash payments to promote other reproductive and child health
behaviors. In addition to their monthly salaries, ASHAs are given payments between Rs
200 ($4) and Rs 600 ($13) for each registered woman utilizing public institutional delivery
in the LP states. In the HP states, no additional payments are made out to the ASHAs.
The cash transfers to ASHAs are expected to reduce absenteeism and improve the overall
performance of healthcare workers themselves.

2.1.2 Past Evaluations of Janani Suraksha Yojna
JSY can be thought of as a quasi-experiment that can be used to study the impact of a
demand-side financing program on the utilization of maternal and child healthcare services.
Most studies have primarily been descriptive, documenting progress in the program’s
implementation in specific states and regions (Devadasan et al., 2008). Under the scope of
causal evaluation, studies have examined the effects of JSY on outcomes such as
institutional delivery and antenatal care (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2014;
Gopalan and Varatharajan, 2012; Gupta et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2010) and child mortality
(Sengupta and Sinha, 2018; Lim et al., 2010). Studies have also estimated the indirect
impacts of JSY on breastfeeding and pregnancy (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Nandi and
Laxminarayan, 2016) as well as immunization (Carvalho et al., 2014).
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The first formal impact evaluation of JSY was conducted by Lim et al. (2010) which
employed three different identification strategies: individual matching, with versus without
the implementation of JSY, and district-level difference-in-differences. One of the most
critical limitations relates to individual matching based on the question of whether women
did or did not receive JSY cash entitlement. In their study, individuals were defined as
treated if they received JSY funds. This led to reverse causality in the treatment group as
women only receive cash when they give birth in a public health facility. They found that
JSY had a significant effect on increasing antenatal care and in-facility births2 .
With the same data as Lim et al. (2010), Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) used a different
statistical approach to evaluate JSY. They exploited variation in the timing of
implementation of JSY at the district-level and defined a treatment variable, ‘exposure’, as
the fraction of women receiving JSY cash benefits relative to the total number of women
giving birth in public health institutions. The decision to deliver at public institutions may
depend on the institution’s ability to pay cash benefits, thus increasing the likelihood of
women using its services. This would overestimate the demand for public institutional
delivery as measured by the ‘exposure’ variable.
The results suggested a significant but smaller impact of JSY on institutional delivery
as compared to Lim et al. (2010). For neonatal mortality, Powell-Jackson et al. (2015)
found a reduction of comparable magnitude to Lim et al. (2010) (-2.7 compared to -2.3 per
1,000 live births), although statistically insignificant.
2

An in-facility birth includes all births in a medical institution under the overall supervision of trained
and competent health personnel.
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Most recently, Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018) evaluated the impact of JSY using
propensity score matching and a fuzzy regression discontinuity model around second births
with data between 2008 and 2015. The study finds a 16-22 percentage point increase in
institutional deliveries. In 2011, a universal maternal healthcare program, Janani Shishu
Suraksha Karyakaram (JSSK), was launched to provide free services to all pregnant women
in public facilities. Since this paper fails to isolate the impact of JSY from JSSK, the total
impact on institutional delivery is erroneously attributed to JSY.
Apart from the direct intended outcome of institutional delivery, studies have also
estimated the impact of JSY on the utilization of auxiliary maternal and child healthcare
services including antenatal and postnatal services, immunization, and breastfeeding.
Unlike the consensus formed on the positive impact of the program on in-facility delivery,
the results for other outcomes are conflicting and inconclusive. Powell-Jackson et al.
(2015), for example, finds no impact of JSY on the utilization of antenatal care. In fact,
they use this evidence to illustrate their parallel trends assumption. Further, that study
finds an increase in breastfeeding and immunization rates while Carvalho et al. (2014) and
Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018) find no effect of the program on exclusive breastfeeding
practices and care-seeking behavior.
Studies evaluating the impact of JSY on woman’s fertility decisions are sparse. Using
a pregnancy indicator at the time of survey, Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) demonstrate the
potential for financial incentives to increase pregnancies and thus, undermine JSY’s own
objective of reducing fertility. According to my knowledge, no study has yet studied the
impact of JSY on woman’s age at first birth.
13

There are various surveys and qualitative studies that comment on the perceptions of
quality and satisfaction with JSY. A 2012 study found that only a third of the women
interviewed in Jharkhand were attracted by the cash benefit under JSY (Srivastava et al.,
2012). Another study (Vellakkal et al., 2017) finds that the trust in the skills of traditional
birth-attendants and the notion of childbirth as a ’natural event’ that requires no
healthcare were the most prevalent impeding factors for home births.
My study’s econometric approach is closest to Joshi and Sivaram (2014). Like them, I
use data from District Level Household Surveys (DLHS). I additionally include time and
state fixed effects to my regression model. Further, I expand on their treatment group to
include all the components of JSY eligibility. I combine information on healthcare supply
from various other data sources to control for the growing healthcare services in the
country. I estimate the impact of JSY on an array of utilization and health outcomes in
addition to their three outcome variables: three or more antenatal visits, delivery in a JSY
facility and checkup within two weeks of delivery. I also evaluate the impact of the
program on women’s fertility decisions using a discrete-time hazard model. Using the
eligibility cut-off age of 19 years, I study whether the program induces women to shift their
pregnancy timing.

2.2 Data

This study uses data from Indian District Level Household Survey (DLHS), District Census
Handbook (DCH), and Rural Health Statistics (RHS) and district-level aggregates from
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Census India, 2011. DLHS is a large-scale, multi-round survey conducted in a
representative sample of households throughout India since 1997 to assess the utilization of
services provided by government facilities and people’s perceptions about the quality of
services. The survey provides state and national information for India on fertility, the
practice of family planning, maternal and child health, reproductive health, nutrition,
anaemia, utilization and quality of health and family planning services. I use three waves
of DLHS data in my sample- II (2002-03), III (2008-09) and IV (2012-13). In addition to
the standard questionnaire, DLHS-III provides additional information on JSY. Further,
unlike other two rounds in which only currently married women ages 15-44 years were
interviewed, DLHS-III interviewed ever-married women (ages 15-49) and never married
women (ages 15-24).
The District Census Handbook (DCH) is a publication of the Census Organization
and contains data on urban and rural areas for each district. It provides information on
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of population at the lowest administrative
unit, village (rural) and town (urban) of each district. DCH contains information on
various types of infrastructure including education, medical resources, drinking water,
communication and transport, post and telegraph, electricity, banking, and other facilities.
From DCH, I use data on health infrastructure including presence of ASHA workers, an
Anganwadi Centre3 , and a Maternity and Child Welfare Centre4 .
3

Anganwadi centers are local government centers that provide pre-school non-formal education and food
to local children.
4
A maternity and child welfare centre provides antenatal and postnatal services for both mother and child.
The services include regular check-up of pregnant women, provision of folic tablets, counseling, delivery,
immunization of children with check-up, etc.
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Published annually since 2005, Rural Health Statistics (RHS) provide infrastructural
information on SCs, PHCs and CHCs. I create a district-level comprehensive health
infrastructure dataset from nine rounds of RHS beginning in 2005. I merge RHS data with
DHS and the district-level aggregates on population and area from the Census.
Implemented under the broader umbrella of the National Rural Mission, JSY was
accompanied by changes to the existing infrastructure and an extensive investment in
building newer health facilities. Between 2005 and 2013, the total investment by the
government equalled nearly $17 billion to increase healthcare facilities as well as provisions
available at existing facilities. As per my data, the average number of SCs and CHCs
increased by 3-5 units per district between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 2.2). The construction of
newer facilities reduced the distance to the nearest available health resources, making
formal care more accessible (Figure B1). An increase in the number of alternatives
influences women’s decisions to utilize formal maternal care and confounds the impact of
financial incentives provided by JSY. Since the rollout of JSY and the increase in supply of
health facilities was simultaneous, I control for these supply changes. This helps isolate the
impact of the program alone, holding the availability of health services constant.
I create a repeated cross-section of ever-married women with at least one pregnancy
reported between 1999 and 2010. The details on healthcare utilization in my dataset are
limited to the most recent birth of women and consequently, I restrict the sample to the
latest birth in a woman’s birth history. The final sample has 335,866 women observations
spanning over 591 districts in 35 states. The identification comes from individual eligibility
rules under JSY to receive cash benefits and the timing of the program.
16

I evaluate the impact of JSY on various direct and indirect outcomes. The direct
utilization outcome is the woman’s place of delivery. The questionnaire asks “Where did
your last delivery take place?” with government facilities, private facilities, home and other
as options5 . Another direct outcome is the presence of a skilled health professional6 in
attendance during delivery. Other utilization outcomes include any antenatal care, number
and timing of visits to the doctor, postnatal check-ups for the mother and child, immediate
breastfeeding by the mother, and immunization.
The main health outcome is child mortality. To measure this, I examine four
variations of child mortality: fetal mortality, neonatal mortality, first week mortality and
infant mortality in the first month. Fetal mortality is the probability of infant death within
28 weeks of gestation. Neonatal mortality measures the probability of infant death within
first 24 hours given a live birth. One week mortality is defined by the probability of death
in the first week of birth given the child survived the first day of birth, and one month
infant mortality measures death within the first month of birth given the infant survived
the first week of birth7 . Understanding the effect of institutional delivery on the incidence
of maternal mortality is important but the lack of data on maternal deaths limits my
ability to examine this outcome. However, I discuss the indirect effect of JSY on maternal
mortality through its impact of various maternal services.
5

There are 2,438 observations which report delivering child at ’Other’. I drop the observations with the
choice of ’Other’ as woman’s place of delivery.
6
Health professional maybe a doctor, nurse, certified midwife, auxiliary nurse midwife, or a lady health
visitor.
7
Since there are definitional variations in the concepts of stillbirths and one-day mortality which the
mothers may not be aware of, I take the responses of women at face value and calculate our estimates. This
suggests that the results must be interpreted with caution.
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics (1999-2010)
Pre-JSY Post-JSY
(1999-2004) (2005-2010)
Woman’s Age
Woman’s Age at First Birth
Poor
Caste-SC/ST
Caste-General
Religion-Hindu
No Education
Village- Health Worker
Village- Distance to Facility
Village-ASHA
District- CHC per sq km
Delivery at Home
Delivery at Public Facility
Skilled Health Professional
Fetal Deaths∗
Neonatal Deaths∗∗
Any Antenatal Care
Atleast 4 Antenatal Visits
First Trimester Antenatal Care
Postnatal Care
Immunization
Breastfeeding

Total
(1999-2010)

Controls
26.40
18.98
0.605
0.393
0.213
0.776
0.561
0.681
3.096
0
0.157

26.10
20.10
0.487
0.402
0.214
0.755
0.472
0.660
2.774
0.665
0.169

26.25
19.55
0.545
0.398
0.214
0.765
0.516
0.670
2.920
0.338
0.163

Outcomes
0.706
0.162
0.318
31.11
20.04
0.670
0.386
0.305
0.368
0.721
0.302

0.578
0.263
0.434
29.30
19.76
0.717
0.446
0.384
0.411
0.764
0.419

0.641
0.213
0.377
30.30
19.99
0.693
0.417
0.345
0.405
0.758
0.360

Observations
165,638
170,228
335,866
Notes: The sample consists of all 35 states and 591 districts from three rounds of the
District Level Households Survey (DLHS).
* Fetal Death Rate is the number of deaths within the gestation period per 1000
pregnancies.
** Neonatal deaths is the number of deaths within the first month of birth
per 1000 live births.
Antenatal care includes checkup during pregnancy, tetanus injections and intake of iron
supplements.
The full forms include: SC/ST - Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe, ASHA - Accredited
Social Health Activists, and CHC- Community Health Centers.
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Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. On
average, women increased their participation in formal healthcare between 1999 and 2010.
The use of auxiliary health services, i.e. antenatal and postnatal care services, increased
between 1999 and 2010. More than 70 percent of women sought antenatal care during
pregnancy and modestly increased their use of postnatal care services. The likelihood of
home births fell from 70.6 to 57.8 percent while the use of public health institutions
increased from 16.2 to 26.3 percent (Figure B5). Figure 2.3 shows the changes in the choice
of place of delivery over time. Table A5 provides details on the descriptive statistics .

Figure 2.3 Choices of Place of Delivery

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II and DLHS III Notes: The dotted
line represents the implementation of JSY in 2005.
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2.3 Methodology

I use repeated cross-sectional data for the most recent births of ever-married women with
at least one pregnancy between 1999 and 2010. My methodology consists of a generalized
difference-in-differences approach. I exploit variations in the individual eligibility rules
across states and the time of implementation of the program. To be eligible for cash
benefits, a woman must either live in a LP state, or be a poor woman above the age of 19
years in a HP state, or belong to Scheduled Caste (SC) / Scheduled Tribe (ST). To receive
the cash transfer, the woman has to be eligible under JSY and use a public health facility
to deliver her child. Around 72 percent of my total sample stands eligible for JSY benefits
(Figure B2).
Consider woman i living in village v in district d at survey time t with at least one
pregnancy in her birth history. The main specification can be written in the following form:

Yidt = β0 + β1 EligibleJSY
+ β2 P ostt + β3 (P ostt XEligibleJSY
id
id )
(2.1)
+ β4 Xidt + β5 γd + β7 γt + idt

where t= 1999, 2000, 2001,..., 2010. The treatment variable, EligibleJSY
id , is an indicator
variable for woman fulfilling the eligibility criteria under JSY(=1)8 . The post-treatment
variable, P ostt , is a time indicator for the implementation of JSY (=1 if t≥ 2005)9 . β1
8

We do not use the actual receipts of JSY cash transfers as our treatment variable like some of the
previous studies. As discussed earlier, using a dummy variable for JSY cash transfers as treatment would
give us inaccurate estimates because of reverse causality between the choice of place of delivery and cash
benefits.
9
In theory, the JSY program was initiated simultaneously across the country; in practice, implementation
was delayed in places, due to various political and administrative challenges. For example, in the state of
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measures the baseline difference between eligible and non-eligible women prior to the
implementation of JSY. β2 measures the average change in the outcome of interest post the
program’s implementation. γd and γt are the district and time fixed effects, respectively;
they account for the impacts of district-invariant and time-level characteristics, respectively,
that could cause changes in the outcome of interest rather than the program. I cluster
errors at the village level to correct for the loss of independent variation within the villages.
β3 provides the intent-to-treat effect. It measures the impact of JSY eligibility on the
treatment population after controlling for the pre-program differences and other
confounding factors, Xidt . I use individual, village and district-level controls. The
individual-level controls include the respondents’ age in years, own and husband’s years of
education (no education, primary (5 years), high school (10 years), secondary (12 years) or
college and above (13+ years)), religion (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian or Other), caste
(General, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Class), region (urban or
rural) and a wealth index. The village-level controls include the presence of an ASHA, any
health worker, distance to nearest health facility and its accessibility around the year. The
district-level controls are the number of CHCs, PHCs and SCs per 1,000 people and per
100 square kilometers.
It is important to note that since changes to the healthcare infrastructure at various
administrative levels coincided with the implementation of the program, controlling for the
varying supply of healthcare resources is key to my estimation strategy. Not accounting for
Uttar Pradesh, issues including political instability, the large population, and the lack of infrastructure and
staff in the field, delayed implementation of the program. That being said, I do not have any information
about the timing of the lags in program implementation and would assume the official launch time of April
2005.(Dagur and Switlick-Prose, 2010)
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these changes would result in the erroneous identification of a portion of the change in
healthcare utilization, given by β3 , as being due to the program rather than due to the
increase in accessibility to healthcare resources.
Equation (1) should satisfy the assumption of parallel trends for β3 to have a causal
interpretation of identifying the treatment effect of JSY eligibility on the outcomes. It
states that the treatment group have similar trends to the control group in the absence of
treatment. In this case, the utilization of health outcomes for eligible women should have
the same trends as ineligible women. Figure 2.4 illustrates the trends for the outcomes of
choice of place of delivery. On an average, with eligible women more likely to give a home
birth, the choice of giving birth at home has fallen over time . After the implementation of
JSY, home births amongst the eligible group rapidly decreased as compared to their
ineligible counterparts10
I expect the estimate of β3 to be positive measuring the outcome of utilization of
public institutional delivery. The cash transfer guaranteed under JSY pays for a portion of
the expenditure incurred during pregnancy at government health institutions; it effectively
reduces the delivery costs only in those institutions. Given this change in prices of delivery
care at government hospitals relative to that at private hospitals and home, women would
shift from both these places of delivery to public institutions. Thus, my hypothesis suggests
that JSY increases the utilization of public institutional delivery while reducing the use of
other alternatives.
10
I perform a sensitivity analysis on the pre-event years to further confirm the parallel trends assumption. (Table B7). The results show insignificant treatment effects which suggests that the parallel trends
assumption holds.
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Figure 2.4 Trends of Outcome Averages for Treatment and Control Groups

Notes: The figure provides evidence of the assumption of parallel trends. The
dotted points are the averages for each year for the outcomes of public institutional
delivery and home births, respectively. The lines are fitted over the pre- and
post-JSY years.

Compared to the average cost of Rs 1433 ($18) for delivery at a government hospital,
the prices for private and home delivery are Rs 22,364 ($300) and Rs 800 ($10)
respectively11 (MOSPI, 2019). With JSY, the cost of delivery at public institution are
reduced. A change in the relative prices of different healthcare seeking options would
change a woman’s behavior to shift to public institutional delivery. This suggests that
women choosing home births and private facilities are more likely to shift to public
institutional delivery after JSY cash transfers began. Since the private and public
11

The per capita income at current prices for India was Rs 25,956 ($340) in 2004-05.
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institutions are substitutes, I expect to find a decrease in the utilization of private services
after JSY was implemented.
Since the program incentivizes women to shift to institutional delivery and introduces
them to formal care, the use of antenatal and postnatal services should increase. Thus, for
other health utilization outcomes, I posit JSY to increase the use of auxiliary services.
More women are expected to seek checkups during pregnancy and in earlier trimesters
along with postpartum checkups.
With institutional delivery, women are in close proximity to immediate obstetric care.
It reduces the risk of complications during childbirth for both, mother and the child,
thereby increasing their likelihood of survival. The program eligibility may also reduce fetal
and neonatal deaths.

2.4 Results

The results presented in this section explain the impact of JSY on the choice of place of
delivery, utilization of antenatal and postnatal care, and child mortality. Additionally, I
evaluate the heterogeneous impact of the program on these outcomes by cohort-wise
exposure to JSY, wealth, education and tribal composition of population. The estimations
control for observed individual and household characteristics, and time-varying village- and
district-level healthcare characteristics. The specifications include district and time fixed
effects with clustering at the district level. Panel A provides the estimates for the complete
sample of states while Panel B is a sub-sample analysis of HP states.
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2.4.1 Place of Delivery
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the impact of JSY from equation (1) on the outcome of
choices of place of delivery. Columns (1)-(3) measure the impact of JSY on home births,
public institutional delivery, and private institutional delivery, respectively.
Table 2.2 Impact of JSY on Place of Delivery
(1)
Home

(2)
Public

(3)
Private

0.00658
(0.004)

0.0330∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0394∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.0179∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.0373∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0184∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.612
277126
0.328

0.229
277126
0.184

0.152
277126
0.239

0.0137∗
(0.005)

0.0442∗∗∗
(0.006)

-0.0583∗∗∗
(0.005)

Eligible x Post JSY

-0.00282
(0.005)

0.00593
(0.006)

-0.00202
(0.005)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.441
114558
0.332

0.317
114558
0.159

0.234
114558
0.271

Panel A: All States
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Mean
Observations
R2
Panel B: High Performing States
Eligible

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent birth
at home (1), public health institution (2), and private health institution (3). Eligible is a binary
variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is a
time dummy variable that equals one for the years after 2005 and zero, otherwise. Controls include
age, education, wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence, husband’s education, child’s
birth order, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and number of PHCs, SCs, CHCs in
district, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included.
Panel A is based on a sample of 35 states and 595 districts while Panel B is based on 25 states and
292 districts. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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The estimates in column (1) report that JSY eligibility leads to a statistically
significant 1.79 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of a home birth. Given the 61
out of 100 eligible women delivered at home in the sample before JSY was implemented,
this is a 3 percent decline. This shift away from home births is absorbed by public health
institutions. Column (2) reports that JSY eligibility leads to a increase in the utilization of
public institutional delivery by 3.73 percentage points (16.3 percent). JSY also reduces the
utilization of private institutional delivery. As column (3) suggests, eligible women are 1.84
percentage points (12 percent) less likely to seek delivery care at private healthcare
facilities. The results suggest that the increase in public facility delivery comes from the
decline in both home and private facility births. The change in relative prices of different
healthcare-seeking options leads to the increase in public institutional delivery. The
substitution away from the private sector accounts for higher proportion of the effect of the
JSY on public facility births. To understand the results, it is important to consider the two
components of JSY: financial incentive (cash transfers)12 and information13 . Women
choosing home births are either affected by one or both the components. They give birth
at home because either they face financial restrictions to use formal healthcare or they lack
medical literacy or both. Others utilizing institutional delivery, public or private, are
affected only by the financial component as they behave as informed individuals already.
The relatively small decline in home births in the presence of JSY means that these women
12

The decision to have or not to have an institutional delivery is constrained by the financial costs of
delivery care. The cash transfers under JSY only reduce the cost of delivery care at a public healthcare
facility by 22-50 percent.
13
Through ASHAs, JSY provides information about the importance of institutional delivery and counsels
for healthier pregnancy practices.

26

are either strongly limited by financial costs or are bounded by beliefs and cultural
practices14 . For women using institutional services, the change in relative prices at the two
types of institutions results in substitution away from the private sector to the public
sector. The large shift away from private facilities suggests that for medically literate
women, JSY cash transfers serve as a strong incentive to use institutional delivery services
at public facilities. Overall, in comparison to the shift from private to public facility
delivery, the combined financial incentives and information provided under JSY are
relatively insufficient to shift women away from home births to institutional care.
For the sub-sample of HP states in Panel B, the estimates provide no evidence of
impact of JSY on institutional delivery. The insignificant results are due to two potential
reasons. First, the information component of JSY is weak in HP states as ASHAs are not
offered financial incentives to counsel women. This suggests that women giving home
births are less likely to understand their importance of formal care and shift to facility
delivery. Second, the cash incentive provided under JSY in HP states is lower than that in
LP states. Given the higher cost of delivery care in HP states15 , the effective prices
reduction with cash transfers are quite small to alter women’s behavior.
14

In certain parts of India, pregnancy is viewed as a normal physiologic phenomenon that does not require
any intervention by health care professionals. Only in the event of a problem will pregnant women seek
medical advice, usually first from women from older generations.
15
HP states are relatively better performing states on all socio-economic parameters and their growth is
reflected in their price levels. Thus, the cost of going to a medical facility is higher in HP states than LP
states. For example, the cost of institutional delivery is as high as $130 in Kerala and Karnataka as compared
to $20 in some LP states.
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2.4.2 Antenatal Care
Table 2.3 presents the results of equation (1) on the outcomes of antenatal care. Column
(1) estimates the impact of JSY on a dummy variable measuring any type antenatal care
used by women16 , column (2) on at least four visits to the doctor during pregnancy, and
column (3) on at least one visit before the second trimester.
The estimate in column (1) provides evidence of an increase in the use of antenatal
services. JSY increases the use of any antenatal care during pregnancy by 3.63 percentage
points (or 5 percent). The estimate is significant at the 1 percent level. Columns (2) and
(3) suggest the program also increases the likelihood of having at least four prenatal care
visits and these visits being early in the pregnancy; the estimates suggest that JSY is
associated with a 7.79 percentage point increase in the probability of eligible women going
for a minimum of four visits and a 6.73 percentage point increase in these visits occurring
before the second trimester.
The results can be explained by the interaction of women with formal healthcare
system under the program (Table 2.4). Column (1) shows that eligible women who had an
ASHA worker in their locality under the program increased the use of any antenatal care
by 4.05 percentage point. Since ASHAs register women for the program during pregnancy,
it becomes likely for them to initiate using the required healthcare services early in this
period. This results in an early exposure to antenatal services and thus, an increase in the
use of these services. However, as the program does not impact total institutional delivery
16

Antenatal care includes visits to the doctor during pregnancy, tetanus shots, and intake of iron supplements.
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Table 2.3 Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care
(1)
Any ANC

(2)
Visits

(3)
Timing

-0.00710∗
(0.003)

-0.000305
(0.004)

-0.0303∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.0363∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.00779∗
(0.004)

0.0673∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.719
277093
0.235

0.441
268913
0.307

0.620
286429
0.211

0.0146∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0164∗∗
(0.005)

0.0120∗
(0.005)

Eligible x Post JSY

0.00611
(0.004)

0.00740
(0.006)

0.00478
(0.005)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.848
114543
0.239

0.648
100830
0.271

0.759
118251
0.175

Panel A: All States
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Mean
Observations
R2
Panel B: High Performing States
Eligible

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent any
antenatal care (1), at least four antenatal visits (2), and visit during first trimester (3). Eligible
is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise.
Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the years after 2005 and zero otherwise.
I use controls including age, education, wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence,
education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and
distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Panel A is based
on a sample of 35 states and 595 districts while Panel B is based on 25 states and 292 districts.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and
1 percent.

in HP states, the effect is not reflected in the use of antenatal services as well. As shown in
columns (4) to (6), the presence of ASHAs in LP states under JSY results in an increased
utilization of antenatal services compared to HP states. Since ASHA workers do not
receive any additional compensation for their work in HP states, there is less incentive for
them to be efficient in their duties of providing information to expecting mothers.
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Table 2.4 Impact of ASHAs on Antenatal Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
Any ANC
Visits
Timing
Eligible

0.00137
(0.003)

0.00393
(0.003)

-0.00973∗∗
(0.003)

ASHA

0.00390
(0.003)

0.0150∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00256
(0.004)

0.0405∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.00102
(0.004)

0.0575∗∗∗
(0.004)

Eligible * ASHA
LP State * ASHA
Mean
Observations
R2

0.848
277048
0.237

0.648
268868
0.309

0.759
283163
0.223

(4)
Any ANC

(5)
Visits

(6)
Timing

-0.00225
(0.003)

0.0183∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00927∗∗
(0.003)

0.0573∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00388
(0.004)

0.0781∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.848
277048
0.237

0.648
268868
0.309

0.759
283163
0.223

Notes: The columns represent any antenatal care (1,4), at least four antenatal visits (2,5), and visit
during first trimester (3,6). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for
JSY benefits and zero otherwise. ASHA is an indicator variable for the presence of ASHA workers
in the village. LP state is a state dummy that equals one if the state is a low-performing state and
zero otherwise. I use controls including age, education, wealth, caste and religion of woman, place
of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA
in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and
1 percent.

Additionally, these results have important implications for maternal mortality. It is
estimated that pregnant women with anemia are twice as likely to die during or shortly
after pregnancy compared to those without the condition (Daru et al., 2018). Thus, given
that there is an increase in ANC services and particularly, iron intake, it could indirectly
impact maternal mortality.
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2.4.3 Postnatal Care
Table 2.5 presents the estimates for the impact of JSY on postnatal services. Columns
(1)-(3) show results for the outcomes of postnatal checkup within the first two weeks of
delivery, breastfeeding within one hour of birth, and immunization, respectively.

Table 2.5 Impact of JSY on Postnatal Care
(1)
Check-up

(2)
Bf

(3)
Imz

0.0277∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0331∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0258∗∗∗
(0.003)

Eligible x Post JSY

-0.0633∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.0454∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.0378∗∗∗
(0.003)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.322
267508
0.250

0.377
272175
0.218

0.710
274900
0.181

-0.0168∗∗
(0.006)

0.0149∗
(0.006)

0.000369
(0.004)

Eligible x Post JSY

-0.0163
(0.009)

0.00307
(0.010)

-0.120∗∗∗
(0.009)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.446
106546
0.285

0.504
112930
0.134

0.801
113797
0.180

Panel A: All States
Eligible

Panel B: High Performing States
Eligible

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent postnatal
checkup of mother within 14 days of delivery (1), breastfeeding within first hour of birth (2), and
infant immunization (3). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for
JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the years
after 2005 and zero otherwise. I use controls including age, education, wealth, caste and religion of
woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker
and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are
included. Panel A is based on a sample of 35 states and 595 districts while Panel B is based on 25
states and 292 districts. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance
levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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Column (1) suggests that JSY eligibility lowers women’s probability of going back for
a postpartum checkup within the next two weeks. Post JSY, eligible women reduced their
postpartum checkups by 6.33 percentage point (or 19.6 percent). The result seems
counter-intuitive given the positive effect of JSY on all other maternal services. The
reduced utilization could be explained by women substituting postpartum care with the
care received during their hospital stay for delivery. Since going back to the health facility
has associated financial and time costs, women may seem reluctant to utilize the service.
Thus, the analysis indicates that immediate delivery care and postnatal care are
substitutes. Studies have found that postnatal checks are important for preventing
maternal deaths (Kikuchi et al., 2015). Reduction in the use of checkups has severe
consequences for the well-being of women.
Columns (2) and (3) suggest that the JSY increases the practice of early breastfeeding
by mothers within the first hour of birth by 4.54 percentage point and infant immunization
by 3.78 percentage points. The results suggest that the increase in the use of cost-less
changes could be due to the mother’s interaction with formal care institutions and
professionals during her visits.

2.4.4 Child Mortality
Table 2.6 presents the impact of JSY on measures of child mortality. Column (1) estimates
the impact on fetal mortality, column (2) on neonatal mortality, column (3) on first week
mortality and column (4) on first month infant mortality. The results must be taken with
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reservations as these are extremely sensitive indicators of mortality due to under-reporting
and misreporting of the stillbirths17 , and even neonatal mortality18 .

Table 2.6 Impact of JSY on Child Mortality

Panel A: All States
Eligible x Post JSY
Mean per 1000
Observations
R2
Panel B: High Performing States
Eligible x Post JSY
Mean per 1000
Observations
R2

(1)
Fetal

(2)
Neonatal

(3)
Week

(4)
Infant

-0.00106∗
(0.001)

-0.00039
(0.001)

0.00024
(0.000)

-0.000177
(0.000)

37.5
271117
0.00399

15.0
270056
0.00613

9.18
268953
0.00816

3.06
268709
0.00634

-0.00254∗∗
(0.001)

-0.00147
(0.001)

-0.00046
(0.000)

-0.000983
(0.001)

35.3
113740
0.00352

13.2
112403
0.00429

6.87
112063
0.00622

3.84
111988
0.00506

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent fetal
mortality (1), neonatal mortality (2), week mortality (3) and infant mortality (4). Eligible is a
binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post
JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after 2005 and zero otherwise.
Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence, education
of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to
the nearest health facility. Panel A is based on a sample of 35 states and 595 districts while Panel
B is based on 25 states and 292 districts. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level
with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

The results suggest that, on average, the mortality rate for infants born to eligible
women is higher than for infants born to the ineligible women. Column (1) suggests that
the program significantly reduces the incidence of stillbirths among births to eligible
17

Stillbirths are fetal deaths in pregnancies lasting seven or more months.
Neonatal or one-day mortality is the death of an infant within 24 hours of birth and could be confused
with a reported stillbirth.
18
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women. Post JSY, fetal mortality reduces by 1.06 live births per 1000 pregnancies. This
likely follows from the increase in the utilization of institutional delivery. With immediate
obstetric care available at the delivery centers, women are less likely to have an
unsuccessful delivery and thus, reducing stillbirths.
Columns (2)-(4) provide no evidence of association between JSY and reduction in
child mortality for live births. Although the results are statistically insignificant, the
confidence intervals around the estimates show a modest effect of JSY on the measures of
child mortality. I find that JSY reduces one-month mortality by 0.18 infants per 1000 live
births. Although statistically insignificant, the result has economic significance. Given the
mean mortality of 3.06 deaths in the first month per 1000 infants surviving the first week,
JSY reduces infant mortality by 6 percent. One plausible explanation could be that the
overall increase in institutional births is not sufficiently large enough to translate into
better child health outcomes (Hulton et al., 2007).

2.4.5 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY
The results in the previous sub-section showed the average effects of the program on
various outcomes for the eligible group. However, there are wide in-group differences in
characteristics, especially in program exposure, education, wealth and area of residence. I
expect heterogeneity in the impact of JSY given these differences. If program targeting is
efficient, then the marginalized women within the sample of eligible women should
experience relatively larger gains from the program. I estimate impact heterogeneity using
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the following specification:
Yidt =β0 + β1 EligibleJSY
+ β2 P ostt + β3 Characteristici + β4 (P ostt × EligibleJSY
id
id )
+ β5 (P ostt × Characteristici ) + β6 (Characteristici × EligibleJSY
id )

(2.2)

+ β7 (Characteristici × EligibleJSY
× P ostt ) + β8 Xidt + β9 γd + β10 δt + idt
id
where Characteristici represents the indicator dummy for the heterogeneous variable of
interest. β7 measures the intended impact of JSY on a sub-group of eligible women.
Table 2.7 presents results for the impact of JSY on different cohorts of eligible women.
Here, the program effects are not characterized as a single effect, but as a distribution of
cohort-specific effects. The cohorts represent different age groups women belonged to as of
when JSY was introduced with 20-24 years old as the baseline. Thus, the estimates
measure the effect of JSY on eligible women of a cohort with respect to those who were
aged 20-24 years in 2005.
Column (1) suggests that the program reduced home births for women who were
introduced to the program as teens relative to those introduced at 20-24 years of age.
These women shifted to public institutional delivery by 1.50 percentage points. As per
column (4), the utilization of antenatal care is also the most significant for the same cohort.
Since women initiate taking fertility and reproductive decisions as early as their teen years,
the program seems effective in altering their decisions to utilize institutional care.
Table 2.8 presents the results for the heterogeneous impact of JSY on choice of place
of delivery by tribal composition (1-3), women’s education (4-6) and wealth (7-9). The
estimates suggest that, post JSY, eligible women living in tribal states are 5.78 percentage
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points more likely to deliver at homes as compared other states. The program significantly
impacts women’s decision to utilize institutional delivery with at least primary education
and belonging to non-poor households more over their counterparts. JSY reduced home
births for educated women by 2.02 percentage points. However, the program does not help
women belonging to poor households; they are 2.78 percentage points more likely to deliver
at homes after the implementation of JSY as compared to relatively richer households.
The results provide evidence of JSY disproportionately impacting to the targeted
groups. The program fails to impact the poorest women population. The financial
constraints for using formal care are strictest for poorer women and thus, the price
reduction provided by the cash incentives under JSY would not enough to alter their
decisions. This suggests that additional financial assistance could be the key to see an
increase in the demand for institutional care by the most vulnerable groups.
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0.229
240446
0.187

Mean
Observations
R2

0.152
240446
0.239

0.0325*
(0.0142)
0.719
240415
0.237

0.00283
(0.0120)

0.441
233045
0.315

0.620
244797
0.212

0.322
232978
0.267

0.377
239071
0.220

-0.00733 -0.00182 -0.0192 -0.0289
(0.0165) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0180)

0.710
239631
0.187

0.0156
(0.0152)

Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent places of delivery (1-3), antenatal care (4-6)
and postnatal care (7-9). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero
otherwise. The different cohorts include: Very low exposure (30 years or more when JSY launched), low (25-29 years),
mid (20-24 years), high (15-19 years) and very high (less than 14 years). Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and
religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA
in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.612
240446
0.332

-0.0307
(0.0176)

Eligible x Very High -0.00679
(0.0157)

0.00382
(0.00518)

0.00939
(0.00525)

-0.0199*** 0.0150*
(0.00555) (0.00583)

Eligible x High

0.0166*** 0.00582 0.0108
-0.0110 0.0197**
(0.00432) (0.00564) (0.00612) (0.00606) (0.00627)

-0.0164*** 0.00170 0.00324 0.00840 -0.0259*** -0.0135**
(0.00399) (0.00491) (0.00520) (0.00495) (0.00530) (0.00431)

-0.0161*** 0.00726
(0.00475) (0.00421)

0.00787
(0.00473)

Eligible x Low

0.00670
(0.00388)

(8)
(9)
Postnatal Care
BF
Imz

0.0648*** -0.0539*** 0.0307*** 0.00876* -0.0151** -0.00724 0.00738
(0.00432) (0.00368) (0.00342) (0.00432) (0.00461) (0.00446) (0.00472)

PNC

(7)

-0.0524*** -0.00255 -0.00189 0.0123* -0.0376*** -0.0425***
(0.00494) (0.00565) (0.00580) (0.00548) (0.00602) (0.00500)

-0.0101*
(0.00421)

(5)
(6)
Antenatal Care
Any ANC Visits
Timing

(4)

Eligible x Very Low 0.0192*** -0.0303*** 0.0122**
(0.00532) (0.00526) (0.00451)

Eligible

Table 2.7 Cohort Effects of JSY on Outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
Place of Delivery
Home
Govt
Private
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0.00200
(0.004)

(6)
Pvt

(7)
Home

(8)
Govt

Eligible x Post JSY 0.0578∗∗∗ -0.0660∗∗∗
x Tribal
(0.015)
(0.015)
0.00451
(0.007)
-0.0202∗∗ 0.0113
(0.007) (0.007)
0.00663
(0.006)

0.0278∗∗∗ -0.00735 -0.0193∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)

0.00127
(0.004)

Mean
0.612
0.229
0.152
0.612
0.229
0.152
0.612
0.228
0.152
N
277126
277126
277126
277126 277126
277126
276950
276950
276950
R2
0.327
0.183
0.237
0.327
0.183
0.238
0.327
0.183
0.238
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of JSY
on place of delivery on different characteristics. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for
JSY benefits and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a dummy for
states with mostly tribal population (more than 60 percent is tribal), Primary Educ is a dummy for women with more
than primary education (more than grade 5), and Poor is a dummy for women living below the poverty line. Controls
include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children,
presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects
are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Eligible x Post JSY
x Poor

Eligible x Post JSY
x Primary Educ

(9)
Pvt

0.0350∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ -0.000895 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0667∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)

(5)
Govt

Eligible x Post JSY -0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.00771 0.0307∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
(0.005) (0.005)

Eligible

Table 2.8 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Place of Delivery
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Home
Govt
Pvt
Home

CHAPTER 3
Universal Maternal Program and Maternal and Child Healthcare
In this chapter, I study the effects of an universal maternal healthcare program on
women’s healthcare utilization and child mortality.

3.1 Introduction

Given the high out of pocket expenses for utilizing maternal care services, the government
of India launched Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakaram (JSSK) in 2011 as an initiative to
ensure better care to pregnant women and children. JSSK provides free services to all
pregnant women including normal deliveries and cesarean operations in public health
institutions. Further, the program extends the free health services to sick newborns (up to
30 days after birth) in both rural and urban areas (Table A4). JSSK aims to motivate
women with financial constraints to access health services and is estimated to benefit more
than 12 million pregnant women (MoHFW, 2015).
The program has yet to be studied in its full capacity as the existing papers only look
at the local-level impact of JSSK on the utilization of services. The two studies (Tyagi et
al., 2016; Salve et al., 2017) use interviews with mothers in public hospitals and record
reviews at local institutions to estimate the impact of JSSK on institutional delivery. Since
these are merely observational studies at a local level, the results cannot be used as
evidence for the evaluation of the program. Tripathi et al. (2014) assessed the impact of
JSSK on OOP expenditure during the perinatal period in Chandigarh and found that
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expenditures for delivery decreased. However, there was no significant difference in
catastrophic health expenditures. My paper would be the first to use JSSK as a
quasi-experiment to study the impact of maternal healthcare programs on the utilization of
services.

3.2 Data

To study the effects of JSSK on women’s healthcare decisions, I use data from the following
two sources: District Level Household Survey (DLHS) and the District Census Handbook
(DCH). DLHS is a household survey conducted by the Government of India and covers
over 600 districts in India. The total number of households representing a district varies
from 1000 to 1500 households per wave. The DLHS provides comprehensive information on
family planning, maternal and child health, reproductive health of ever-married women and
adolescent girls, utilization of maternal and child healthcare services. In addition, it also
provides information on newborn care, post-natal care within 48 hours, role of ASHAs in
enhancing the reproductive and child health care and coverage of JSY. We use three waves
of DLHS data-II (2002-03), III (2008-09) and IV (2012-13). Since DLHS-IV only reports
data for the high performing states, I restrict my analysis to these states.
The District Census Handbook (DCH) is a publication of the Census Organization,
and it contains data on urban and rural areas for each district. It provides information on
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of population at the lowest administrative
unit i.e. of each village and town of the district. DCH contains information on various
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infrastructure facilities available in the village and town including education, medical
resources, drinking water, communication and transport, electricity, banking, and other
miscellaneous facilities. We use data on health infrastructure from DCH.
From the above data sources, I create a pooled cross-sectional database of all married
women who have had at least one pregnancy for the time period 1999-2013.I restrict the
data to the most recent birth of each woman. It is important to note that JSY was not
discontinued after the implementation of JSSK and thus, women received benefits under
both programs simultaneously after 2011. This meant that in post JSSK-regime,
JSY-eligible women received free maternal care under JSSK, plus a cash transfer under
JSY for utilizing public institutional delivery and JSY-ineligible women received free
maternal care services only. Given the timing of the programs, we restrict our sample till
2010 for the estimation of the impact of JSY. For the estimation of the added impact of
the introduction of JSSK over JSY conditional cash benefits on the utilization of
healthcare services, we use our full timeline from 1999 to 2013. However, post 2011, data is
only available for the high performing states. Thus, unlike JSY, our analysis for JSSK
which was implemented in 2011, is restricted to HP states.
My main utilization outcome is whether the woman gave birth in a health facility
which is calculated using the information on the place of delivery from the woman’s record
of most recent birth. I also analyze the impact of the program’s on different types of health
institution (private or public) and attendance of a health worker during delivery. My other
utilization outcomes of interest are antenatal and postnatal check-up of the mother and
child, immediate breastfeeding by the mother and immunization.
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My main health outcome is child mortality. To measure this, I use four different
variations: fetal mortality, neonatal mortality, perinatal mortality and infant mortality.
Fetal mortality is the number of deaths within 28 weeks of gestation per 1000 pregnancies
and perinatal mortality is the number of deaths within 28 weeks of gestation or first month
of birth per 1000 pregnancies. Neonatal mortality measures the number of deaths within
the first month of birth per 1000 live births while infant mortality measures the number of
deaths within the first year of birth given the infant survives the first month of birth1 . I
will not estimate the impact of the programs on maternal mortality rates. Although I
believe that it is very important to study whether a change in institutional delivery reduces
the incidence of mortality among women, the lack of data on maternal deaths limits our
research in this regard. The changes in the choice of place of delivery over time is shown in
Figure 3.1. The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2.

3.3 Methodology

JSSK was rolled out across the country simultaneously and had no eligibility conditions.
Thus, there is a lack of variability to estimate the program’s impact on the utilization of
healthcare services. In this paper, I can only estimate the additional impact of JSY in the
presence of universal maternal healthcare under JSSK. The idea is that with only JSY
benefits available to the eligible women before 2011, the cash transfers under JSY had a
price reduction effect on the utilization of healthcare services and were used to cover some
1

Since there are definitional variations in the concepts of stillbirths and one-day mortality which the
mothers may not be aware of, we take the responses of women at face value and calculate our estimates.
This suggests that the results must be interpreted with caution
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Figure 3.1 Choices of Place of Delivery for High Performing States

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II, III and IV. Notes: The dotted line represents
the implementation of JSY in 2005 and JSSK in 2011.

of the delivery costs. However, with the implementation of JSSK, JSY-eligible women now
have access to free care and an additional income equivalent to the cash transfer amount.
Since the same cash transfer has a differential impact on the eligible women, I expect
differences in the impact of JSY with and without JSSK.
We use a similar estimation strategy as before and use the data from high-performing
states between 2000 and 2013. Using the following, I estimate the additional impact of free
maternal healthcare services over a conditional cash transfer on the utilization of services
and health outcomes.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for High Performing States (1999-2013)
Not Eligible

JSY Eligible

Total

Controls
Woman’s Age
Wealth Index
Poor
Caste- SC
Caste-ST
Religion- Hindu
No Education
Village- ASHA

26.904
0.508
0.288
0.106
0.192
0.663
0.322
0.334

24.314
0.429
0.572
0.378
0.397
0.648
0.298
0.419

25.955
0.479
0.392
0.206
0.267
0.657
0.313
0.365

0.422
0.398
0.785
0
0
0.848
0.536

0.347
0.420
0.779
0
0
0.840
0.514

Outcomes
Delivery at Public Institution
Delivery at Home
Skilled Health Professional
Neonatal Death
Fetal Death
Any Antenatal Care
Breastfeeding within Hour
Observations

0.304
0.433
0.775
0
0
0.836
0.501
105,288

61,010

166,298

Notes: The sample consists of only 25 states from three rounds of the DLHS
* Fetal Death Rate is the number of deaths within the gestation period per 1000 pregnancies.
** Neonatal mortality is the number of deaths within the first month of birth per 1000 live births.
Antenatal care includes checkup during pregnancy, tetanus injections and intake of iron.
The full forms include: SC/ST - Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe, ASHA - Accredited Social
Health Activists.

Outcomeidt =α0 + α1 EligibleJSY
+ α2 P ostJSY
+ α3 P ostJSY
∗ EligibleJSY
+ α4 P ostJSSK
id
t
t
id
t
+ α6 Xidt + α7 γd + α8 δt + idt
+ α5 P ostJSSK
∗ EligibleJSY
id
t
(3.1)

where P ostJSSK
represent a dummy for time after the implementation of JSSK in
t
2011. α4 estimates the overall change in the outcome after JSSK was implemented in 2011.
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The coefficient of interest, α5 , estimates the change in the outcome for individuals who now
get free maternal healthcare and were already eligible for JSY cash benefits. We use the
same set of controls along with district and time fixed effects as used for equation (1).

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Choice of Place of Delivery
After the implementation of JSSK in 2011, all services related to maternal health care were
available free of cost to pregnant women at public health institutions. The results from
specification (2) for the choice of place of delivery are provided in Table 3.4. From column
(1), I find that, unlike JSY, JSSK significantly increases the utilization of institutional
delivery in HP states. The results show a 9.6 percent decrease in home births for JSY
eligible women after the implementation of JSSK. The decline can be attributed to the free
delivery services provided under JSSK along with the cash receipts under JSY. From the
estimates on JSY, I find that the JSY exclusively fails to reduce home births in HP states
due to two potential reasons. One being the low cash incentive of the program and the
other being traditions and customs. However, with JSSK which provides services free of
cost, I find a significant impact on the movement of women towards institutional delivery.
The low amount of money under JSY in HP states could be the main reason for the cash
incentive program’s failure in HP states. Another important feature of the results is that
the increase in the use of institutional care from JSSK in HP states is greater in magnitude
than the increase by JSY in the whole country.

45

Table 3.2 Impact of JSY and JSSK on Choice of Place of Delivery
(1)
(2)
(3)
Home
Govt
Pvt

(4)
Doc

Eligible

0.0140**
(0.00533)

0.0160**
(0.00588)

-0.0304***
(0.00503)

-0.0139**
(0.00533)

Eligible* Post JSY

-0.00133
(0.00501)

-0.00149
(0.00522)

0.00325
(0.00446)

-0.00271
(0.00503)

Eligible* Post JSSK

-0.0410***
(0.00526)

0.0289***
(0.00682)

0.0121*
(0.00576)

0.0435***
(0.00518)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.426
145640
0.342

0.345
145640
0.174

0.224
145640
0.251

0.599
144703
0.332

Notes: The coefficients are reported from specification (2). The columns represent birth at home
(1), birth at public health institution (2), birth at private health institution (3) and presence of
health professional at birth (4). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible
for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the
time period after 2005 and zero otherwise. Controls include the characters tics of the woman,
household and village. We include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of
residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in
village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included.Panel
A is based on a sample of 25 states and 301 districts. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

The decline in home births is accompanied by an increase in the use of public and
private institutional delivery. While I estimate an overall increase of 8 percent in the use of
public health institutions for delivery care, private facilities also witness an increase of 5
percent at the same time. The increase in the use of private healthcare services after JSSK
is due to wealthier women shifting away from public facilities after an increased demand for
public healthcare services. In other words, the now crowded government hospitals and
other institutions could result in some women moving away to other types of formal care
institutions, thereby increasing the use of private care.
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3.4.2 Child Mortality
The estimates of the impact of the two programs on child mortality are given in Table 3.3.
The results from column (1) suggest that JSY reduced the probability of fetal deaths by
0.85 pp in the HP states. However, I do not find any significant impact of JSSK on fetal
mortality. The results are similar for other measures of child mortality. Given that the
delivery care services under JSSK are free and I find a significant increase in the uptake of
institutional delivery, the null results are surprising.

Table 3.3 Impact of JSY and JSSK on Child Mortality
(1)
(2)
Fetal
Neonatal

(3)
Perinatal

(4)
Infant

Eligible

0.00407*
(0.00187)

0.00235
(0.00128)

0.00629**
(0.00223)

0.000449
(0.000355)

Eligible* Post JSY

-0.00850***
(0.00180)

-0.00148
(0.00125)

-0.00966***
(0.00214)

-0.000353
(0.000322)

Eligible* Post JSSK

-0.000335
(0.00243)

-0.000938
(0.00145)

-0.00139
(0.00277)

-0.000112
(0.000213)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.029
149818
0.032

0.011
145881
0.029

0.039
149818
0.043

0.001
145936
0.017

Notes: The coefficients are reported from specification (2). The columns represent fetal mortality
(1), neonatal mortality (2), perinatal mortality (3) and infant mortality (4). Eligible is a binary
variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a
time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after 2005 and zero otherwise. Controls
include the characters tics of the woman, household and village. We include age, education,wealth,
caste and religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children,
presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District
and time fixed effects are included. Panel A is based on a sample of 25 states and 301 districts.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and
1 percent.
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3.4.3 Antenatal Care
The results for the impact of JSY and JSSK on ANC are given in Table 3.4. The
implementation of JSSK significantly increases the use of any ANC compared to JSY. The
increase in the use of care results from the incentive of free drugs and consumables
provided at public health institutions during the gestation period with JSSK. JSY does not
provide any financial incentive for the use of ANC services. I estimate that the utilization
of any ANC service increases by 3.22 pp and the use of recommended care increases by 4.06
pp after the implementation of JSSK. Further, the program induces 9 percent more women
to go for ANC checkups in the first trimester of their pregnancy. The use of ANC is
indicative of better continuum of care for mothers and their newborns. I expect these
results to indirectly impact maternal and child mortality as well.

3.4.4 Postnatal Care
Table 3.5 presents the results for the impact of the two programs on utilization of postnatal
services. I find that the free services provided under JSSK increase the utilization of all
postnatal services. Following from the results on the use of institutional delivery, I estimate
that, unlike JSY, JSSK increases the probability of newborns receiving their first checkup
within the first 48 hours of birth. The reason for the increase is the use of institutional
delivery in HP states which makes the checkup of newborns very likely during the mother’s
stay in the hospital. Further, with JSSK, there are no costs associated with newborns’
examinations at the facility and thus, the null financial cost of checkups also increases the
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Table 3.4 Impact of JSY and JSSK on Antenatal Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Any
At least
Iron
Visit in
Rec
Antenatal Care Three Visits Supplements 1st Trimester ANC
Eligible

-0.0117***
(0.00350)

-0.0377***
(0.00533)

-0.00614
(0.00475)

-0.0643***
(0.00590)

-0.0344***
(0.00575)

Eligible* Post JSY

0.00462
(0.00368)

0.0150**
(0.00512)

0.0317***
(0.00460)

0.0298***
(0.00551)

0.00936
(0.00539)

Eligible* Post JSSK 0.0322***
(0.00458)

0.0202***
(0.00613)

-0.00617
(0.00607)

0.0459***
(0.00666)

0.0406***
(0.00656)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.633
144689
0.230

0.760
137446
0.170

0.508
149832
0.158

0.534
146964
0.202

0.837
146894
0.227

Notes: The coefficients are reported from specification (2). The columns represent fetal any antenatal care received during pregnancy (1), going for at least three ANC visits (2), taking at least
100 iron tablets or supplements during pregnancy (3), visiting the doctor in the first trimester (4)
and receiving recommended ANC (5). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is
eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for
the time period after 2005 and zero otherwise. Controls include the characters tics of the woman,
household and village. We include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of
residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in
village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included.
Panel A is based on a sample of 25 states and 301 districts. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

incidence of postnatal care of infants.
From column (2), I find an 8 percent (or 3.84 pp) increase in the probability of women
seeking postpartum care within the first 14 days of giving birth. My analysis in the
previous section suggested that JSY reduced the incidence of women returning to the
health facility for a checkup. Instead, they substituted their postpartum checkup with the
care received during their stay at the hospital for delivery. JSY only covers some portion of
delivery costs and provides no incentive to women to return for follow-ups at the hospital.
With the introduction of JSSK, postpartum checkups are provided free of cost which
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reduces the effective price of PNC services to zero. With no associated financial costs for
checkups, women tend to visit the doctor for a postpartum checkup.

Table 3.5 Impact of JSY and JSSK on Postnatal Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
PNC-Child
PNC-Mother
Breastfeeding

(4)
Immunization

Eligible

0.0105
(0.00995)

0.0654***
(0.00569)

0.0226***
(0.00616)

-0.00837
(0.00439)

Eligible* Post JSY

-0.00976
(0.00917)

-0.104***
(0.00535)

-0.00929
(0.00575)

-0.00459
(0.00431)

Eligible* Post JSSK

0.0265***
(0.00646)

0.0384***
(0.00646)

0.0173*
(0.00697)

0.0351***
(0.00555)

Mean
0.637
0.482
0.515
0.820
Observations
106084
138555
144944
145881
R2
0.237
0.281
0.123
0.163
Notes: The coefficients are reported from specification (2). The columns represent
checkup of child within first 48 hours (1), checkup of woman within first 14 days (2),
breastfeeding within first hour of birth (3) and immunization of child (4). Eligible is
a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero
otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after
2005 and zero otherwise. Controls include the characteristics of the woman, household and
village. We include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence,
education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in
village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are
included. Panel A is based on a sample of 25 states and 301 districts. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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3.4.5 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY and JSSK
For JSSK, the heterogeneity estimation is given by a similar specification as JSY and the
results are presented in Table 3.6 and 3.7.
+ β2 P ostt + β3 Characteristici + β4 P ostt ∗ EligibleJSY
Outcomeidt =β0 + β1 EligibleJSY
id
id
+ β5 P ostt ∗ Characteristici + β6 Characteristici ∗ EligibleJSY
id
+ β7 Characteristici ∗ EligibleJSY
∗ P ostt + β8 P ostJSSK
id
t
+ β9 P ostJSSK
∗ EligibleJSY
+ β10 P ostJSSK
∗ Characteristici
t
id
t
+ β11 Characteristici ∗ EligibleJSY
∗ P ostJSSK
id
t
+ β12 Xidt + β13 γd + β14 δt + idt
(3.2)

The significantly negative estimates, β10 , for the interaction effect of women’s
education and wealth with JSSK suggest that the impact of free services under JSSK on
JSY non-eligible women was greater for more-educated and poor women. This indicates
that the probability of home births reduced by 9.18 pp for women with more than primary
education and by 7 pp for women in the bottom two wealth percentiles. I do not find any
significant heterogeneity in the impact of JSSK on JSY eligible women except for their
choice to utilize private institutional delivery. The results from Table 3.7 show that poorer
eligible women reduced the use of private delivery care by 3.26 pp after the implementation
of JSSK. The results also show that the JSSK had no significant heterogeneous impact on
the child mortality measures.
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0.0378*** 0.0589*** -0.0972*** -0.0312*** -0.000123 -0.000286 -0.000341 0.000162
(0.00827) (0.00782) (0.00671) (0.00844) (0.00238) (0.00175) (0.00293) (0.000479)
0.0220** -0.0302*** 0.00806
(0.00829) (0.00803) (0.00741)

Post JSY* Education

0.0283*
(0.0131)

-0.0000331 -0.00749* -0.00746 0.000358
(0.00530) (0.00356) (0.00624) (0.000406)

Observations
145630
145630
145630
144693
149818
145881
149818
145936
R2
0.345
0.177
0.262
0.336
0.032
0.029
0.043
0.017
Notes: The coefficients are reported from specification (4). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is
eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after
2005 and zero otherwise. Post JSSK is a time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after 2011 and zero
otherwise. Controls include the characteristics of the woman, household and village. We include age, education,wealth,
caste and religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker
and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.0160
(0.0117)

-0.0228
(0.0132)

Eligible* Post JSSK* Education

0.00672
(0.0154)

0.0918*** -0.0651*** -0.0265** -0.101*** -0.000500 0.00545 0.00499 -0.000447
(0.0108)
(0.0127)
(0.0100)
(0.0107) (0.00443) (0.00293) (0.00518) (0.000321)

-0.00427 0.00685* 0.00249 -0.000601
(0.00368) (0.00284) (0.00454) (0.000609)

Post JSSK* Education

0.0305**
(0.0109)

-0.0374*** 0.0282**
(0.0108)
(0.0106)

Eligible* Post JSY* Education

0.00974
(0.00886)

-0.0203* 0.00789** -0.00261 0.00502 0.000999*
(0.00839) (0.00290) (0.00227) (0.00359) (0.000475)

-0.00249 -0.00305* -0.00535* -0.000476
(0.00189) (0.00140) (0.00234) (0.000358)

-0.000966 0.00409 0.00299 -0.000421
(0.00448) (0.00316) (0.00535) (0.000320)

Eligible* Education

0.140***
(0.00660)

0.0191
(0.0119)

-0.145*** 0.0429*** 0.102***
(0.00650) (0.00604) (0.00575)

0.0172
(0.00942)

Education

0.00501
(0.0131)

-0.0221
(0.0119)

(8)
Infant

Eligible* Post JSSK

(6)
(7)
Neonatal Perinatal

0.0342*** -0.00946 -0.0247*** -0.0332*** -0.00340 -0.00564* -0.00872* 0.000233
(0.00888) (0.00819) (0.00674) (0.00909) (0.00296) (0.00246) (0.00375) (0.000520)

(5)
Fetal

Eligible* Post JSY

Table 3.6 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY and JSSK on Outcomes by Education
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Home
Govt
Pvt
Doc
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0.268***
(0.0158)
-0.0559*** -0.00686
(0.0170)
(0.0158)
0.00618
(0.0170)

Wealth

Eligible* Wealth

Post JSY* Wealth

(6)
(7)
Neonatal Perinatal

(8)
Infant

-0.0326** -0.0277
(0.0124)
(0.0159)

-0.00224
(0.00596)

-0.000332
(0.000265)

0.000166
(0.00144)

-0.000583
(0.00154)

0.00347 0.00140
(0.00436) (0.00723)

0.000450
(0.000474)

-0.000971 -0.000829 0.000186
(0.00377) (0.00616) (0.000425)

-0.00916 0.00301
(0.00495) (0.00815)

-0.00341 -0.0211** -0.00256
(0.00435) (0.00711) (0.00135)

0.00369 0.00161
(0.00389) (0.00677)

0.00909* 0.0369*** 0.00296*
(0.00372) (0.00647) (0.00127)

-0.00176 -0.00303
(0.00163) (0.00311)

Observations
145630
145630
145630
144693
149818
145881
149818
145936
R2
0.347
0.177
0.265
0.338
0.032
0.030
0.044
0.018
Notes: Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY
is a time dummy variable that equals one for the time period after 2005 and zero otherwise. Post JSSK is a time dummy
variable that equals one for the time period after 2011 and zero otherwise. We include age, education,wealth, caste and
religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA
in village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.0126
(0.0179)

0.0623*** 0.0800*** 0.000493
(0.0110)
(0.0136) (0.00505)

-0.0691*** 0.00680
(0.0137)
(0.0156)

Post JSSK* Wealth

-0.0187**
(0.00574)

-0.00206
(0.00560)

-0.0535** 0.0123
(0.0203) (0.00662)

-0.0504*** -0.0114
(0.0113)
(0.0179)

0.0608*** 0.0373*
(0.0109)
(0.0179)

0.0718*** -0.0830*** 0.0132
(0.0195)
(0.0186)
(0.0127)

Eligible* Post JSSK* Wealth 0.0200
(0.0159)

0.0465*** -0.00119
(0.00558) (0.00273)

-0.273*** -0.259*** 0.0290***
(0.0111)
(0.0167) (0.00538)

0.0210**
(0.00663)

Eligible* Post JSY* Wealth

0.0444**
(0.0161)

0.00489
(0.0150)

-0.0438*** 0.0229**
(0.00569) (0.00764)

Eligible* Post JSSK

(5)
Fetal

0.0240*** -0.0197*** -0.000918 -0.00778*** 0.000621 -0.00693** 0.000133
(0.00576) (0.00489) (0.00545) (0.00197)
(0.00139) (0.00235) (0.000367)

-0.00414
(0.00544)

Eligible* Post JSY

Table 3.7 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY and JSSK on Outcomes by Wealth
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Home
Govt
Pvt
Doc

CHAPTER 4
Maternal Healthcare Programs and Fertility Choices
4.1 JSY and Fertility Choices

In this chapter, I study the impact of the eligibility criteria for cash transfers under JSY on
woman’s pregnancy timing. As per the guidelines, all pregnant women delivering in a
public health institution are eligible for cash benefits in the LP states. In HP states, poor
women who are at least 19 years old or belonging to SC/ST caste with at most two live
births are eligible for cash transfers. The eligibility criteria incentivizes women to increase
their age at first birth and reduce the overall fertility rate. Since the cash benefits are
available to women above 19 years of age, I expect the program to discourage early-age
childbirths and postpone pregnancies.
Early age childbirths have significant biological effects on adolescent mothers and
their infants and endanger their health (Gibbs et al., 2012; Fall et al., 2015; Yu et al.,
2016). In India, pregnancy-related complications are the biggest contributors of mortality
for girls between the ages of 15 and 19 (Nove et al., 2014; WHO et al., 2019). Women who
have children in their early reproductive years tend to have higher fertility rates as well.
Since fertility choices and pregnancy timings are critical to women’s health, evaluation of
JSY on these outcomes becomes more relevant.
Most Indian women marry by the age of 19. Further, they have their first pregnancy
with in the first year of marriage with the median age of 19.6 years. More than two-thirds
of women aged 15–49 years have their first child before the age of 21. There are significant
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Figure 4.1 Observed Birth Hazard (Pre-JSY (1999-2004))

Notes: The hazard curve shows the observed proportion of eligible women — among those
who have not reported earlier child birth — who report a first birth at each age period
before (a) and after (b) the program was implemented. The figure uses data from DLHS
between 1999-2010.

differences in these statistics by women’s wealth and education. For example, there is a
3-year difference in the age at first birth between women with no education (18.4 years)
and those with more than 12 years of education (21.4 years). Over their reproductive ages,
women in India tend to have an average of 2.9 children. Unlike the age at first birth, there
are no significant differences in fertility rates by wealth status or education.
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Figure 4.2 Observed Birth Hazard (Post-JSY (2005-2010))

Notes: The hazard curve shows the observed proportion of eligible women — among those
who have not reported earlier child birth — who report a first birth at each age period
before (a) and after (b) the program was implemented. The figure uses data from DLHS
between 1999-2010.

Figure 4.1 shows the pre-reform empirical hazard of giving birth at different ages at
the baseline and depicts age-time periods with the least and the highest risk of having a
first birth. The curve has an inverted-U shape indicating a non-constant probability of first
birth at different ages. The observed hazard of a first birth for eligible women shows a
steep rise after the age of 15 years up to 19 years, and followed by a constant rate for
another six years. The hazard tails off after a steep decline from 25 years onward. After
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the implementation of JSY, as shown in Figure 4.2, the probability of giving birth for the
eligible population shifts by another year at the peak. Post the implementation of JSY,
around 27 percent of eligible women, who have not already given birth, report their first
birth at the age of 20.

4.2 Methodology

First, I estimate the impact of JSY on women’s first birth timing. For the analysis, I do not
use the same concept of JSY eligibility as previously used in the paper. These eligibility
rules, by themselves, have a component of age at first birth, built into them. Therefore, I
use the concept of potential eligibility 1 for estimating the impact of JSY on woman’s age at
first birth. Thus, potentially, women who live below the poverty line or belong to SC/ ST
communities are eligible for JSY cash benefits, given that she has her first child after the
age of 19. The simple OLS estimation equation is given by the following:
Yi =β1 + β2 P otentialEligibleJSY
+ β3 P ostJSYt
i
+ β4 (P otentialEligibleJSY
× P ostJSYt ) + β5 Xivdt
i

(4.1)

+ γd + γt + ivdt
where Yi is the outcome dummy variable that equals one if woman i0 s age at first birth is
at least 19 years. β4 measures the impact of JSY potential eligibility on the decision to
have the first child after the cut-off age of 19 years.
1

Potential eligibility is defined by the exogenous components of the eligibility criteria, namely belonging
to either SC/ST caste or living below the poverty line.
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4.2.1 Discrete-Time Hazard Model
To formally estimate the impact of JSY on a woman’s decision to postpone pregnancy, I
use a discrete-time hazard model (Appendix ??). Since the question involves
decision-making (of whether to have a child) at every age of the reproductive cycle, a
hazard approach analyzing the probability of birth over time is appropriate. Apart from
taking into account the sequential nature of decisions, the discrete-time hazard model also
helps to examine heterogeneous impacts at different ages.
Given the duration data collected in our sample is in discrete periods, i.e. by yearly
age, the analysis is conducted using the standard discrete dependent variable logit model.
Further, since I analyze the occurrence of only one outcome—women’s age at first
birth—the method is considered a single-risk discrete-time hazard model. Restricting
women’s age between 15 and 30 years for her first birth, data for every woman, i, is
duplicated for each a = 15, 16, .., 30. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the
woman reports first birth at age a = ai and zero for each a < ai . Once the first birth is
reported, woman’s information for a > ai are removed2 . The estimation is given by the
following equation:
Logitλi (aj ) = α(BirthTime) +

δ1 (EligibleJSY
)
i

+

2010
X

Γt (T imet )

t=2000

+
+

2010
X
t=2000
2010
X

γt (EligibleJSY
× T imet ) + ζ(BirthTime × EligibleJSY
)
i
i

(4.2)

ηt (BirthTime ∗ T imet ∗ EligibleJSY
) + Xβ + γd + ij
i

t=2000
2
For example, if the woman reported her first birth at the age of 19, the dependant variable would be
equal to zero for a = 15, 16, 17, 18, one for a = 19 and missing for a = 20, 21, .., 29, 30.
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where α(BirthTime) = (α1 D15 + α2 D16 + ... + α16 D30) and D15 to D30 are
age-time dummies for woman’s potential first birth age. λi (tj ) is a dummy indicator for
woman i failing in time t, i.e. λi (tj ) = 1 when the woman gives birth at time t given no
reported earlier child birth. EligibleJSY
is an indicator for JSY- potentially eligible women
i
while T imet are year dummies.

4.3 Results
I run equation (3.2) using the sample of all women at least 19 years and above3 . The
results are presented in Table 4.1. Column (3) suggests that, prior to JSY, potentially
eligible women were more likely to have their first birth in their teen years. As compared to
ineligible women, they were 3.14 percentage points more likely to have their first birth
before 19 years of age. The program facilitates postponement of their pregnancy decision.
Following JSY, potentially eligible women become 2.40 percentage point more likely to
have their first birth after the cut-off age of 19 years. This suggests that women solely
eligible for JSY benefits by their exogenic characteristics (income and caste characteristics)
significantly postpone their fertility decisions to be able to participate in the program and
receive cash benefits.
Next, I run equation (3.2) for each age between 15 and 30 years, i.e.
t={15,16,...29,30}4 . This estimates the impact of JSY eligibility rules on woman’s decision
3

To evaluate whether the woman decided to give birth at the age of 19, she must at least be 19 years.
Restricting the sample to all women above 19 years eliminates the bias generated by women who are yet to
be 19 years old.
4
As we know, the probability of giving birth at different ages is not constant. Thus, it is expected that
the program’s impact on woman’s decision of first birth at different ages would be heterogeneous.
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Table 4.1 Impact of JSY on Age at First Birth
(1)
≥ 19years

(2)
≥ 19years

(3)
≥ 19years

(4)
≥ 19years

Potential Eligible

-0.0312***
(0.0036)

-0.0324***
(0.0055)

Potential Eligible* Post JSY

0.0240***
(0.0037)

0.0302***
(0.0051)

Eligible

0.163***
(0.0036)

0.213***
(0.0044)

Eligible* Post JSY

0.0190***
(0.0038)

0.00745
(0.0051)

States Included
All
HPS
All
HPS
Mean
0.660
0.716
0.660
0.716
Observations
272597
112972
272597
112972
R2
0.198
0.262
0.188
0.229
Notes: Potential Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman lives below the
poverty line or belongs to SC/ST caste. The outcome is an indicator variable which equals
one if woman’s age of first birth is above the cut-off age of 19 years, and zero otherwise.
The sample includes women who are at least 19 years old. District and time fixed effects are
included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

to give birth at different ages. Table 4.2 presents the results for the effect of potential JSY
eligibility on woman’s decision to have the first child at any age between 15 and 30 years.
Here, the sample for estimation includes all women who are at least 30 years old5 . The
coefficients on P otentialEligible from columns (1) and (2) suggest that potentially eligible
women are significantly more likely to have their first births in the early teen years as
compared to their same age ineligible counterparts. However, after the implementation of
JSY, these women tend to significantly postpone their birthing decision by at least an year.
5

2To evaluate whether the woman decided to give birth at the age of 19, she must at least be 19 years.
Restricting the sample to all women above 19 years eliminates the exogenous censoring generated by women
who are yet to be 19 years old.
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0.00789**
(0.00246)

(3)
17

(4)
18

(5)
19

(6)
20

(7)
21

(8)
22

0.0139*** 0.00295 -0.00397 0.000464 -0.00649 -0.0250*** -0.0108*
(0.00336) (0.00423) (0.00483) (0.00540) (0.00566) (0.00541) (0.00515)

(2)
16

(12)
26

66083
0.068

(13)
27

64521
0.054

(14)
28

63472
0.045

(15)
29

62781
0.036

-0.00305 0.00710 0.00287 0.00377 -0.00498
(0.00429) (0.00399) (0.00358) (0.00309) (0.00278)

0.00244 -0.00188 0.00228 0.000554 0.00381
(0.00371) (0.00348) (0.00312) (0.00263) (0.00233)

(11)
25

67720
0.069

-0.00453
(0.00235)

0.00230
(0.00185)

(16)
30

64042
0.033

Observations
64801
66053
67009
67418
68210
68732
69190
69548
R2
0.035
0.044
0.056
0.053
0.059
0.060
0.066
0.060
Notes: Potential Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman lives below the poverty line or belongs to
SC/ST caste. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.00735
(0.00457)

Potential Eligible* Post JSY -0.00346
(0.00513)

(10)
24

69181
0.059

-0.00396
(0.00405)

(9)
23

71018
0.044

-0.00525
(0.00454)

Potential Eligible

Observations
R2

Potential Eligible* Post JSY -0.00951*** -0.0172*** -0.00771 0.00315 0.00700 0.0131* 0.0217*** 0.0132*
(0.00228)
(0.00327) (0.00416) (0.00485) (0.00551) (0.00594) (0.00582) (0.00556)

Potential Eligible

(1)
15

Table 4.2 Impact of JSY Eligibility on Woman’s Age at First Birth

The two sets of estimates (Tables 4.1 & 4.2) present two critical results on the impact
of JSY: first, potentially eligible women do indeed postpone having their first child to after
the cut-off age of 19 years when they can receive the cash benefits under JSY. Women
postponing their decision to reap JSY benefits are the ones who would have given birth a
little shy of 19 years, suggesting that the cash incentive is only worth a few months of
postponement for women. Second, the program also reduces the extent of early-teen
pregnancies for potentially eligible women. Although these women do not seem to change
behavior in response to the cash incentive, the reduction in pregnancies in early teens could
be due to information dissemination brought about by the program. Studies show that
husbands’ and household’s domination of decision-making is significantly associated with
women who are younger and less educated (Mullany et al., 2005). Thus, the reason for
women to merely shift their first pregnancy by a year or so in their teens while not taking
advantage of the cash benefits may be due to the fact that pregnancy decisions are
collective decisions by households with limited authority of women6 (Mistry et al., 2009).
I approach hazard modeling— estimating Equation (4)— by beginning with a simple
baseline function. The baseline is estimated using a simple discrete-time hazard model
with a standard logistic regression model that includes BirthTime and no intercept.
Figure 4.3 depicts the hazard estimates of a simple baseline function for the different age
indicator variables for effect of time on the hazard of giving birth. The baseline hazard
curve for first birth rises from age 15 to 25, and then appears to decline afterwards.
6

The concept of women’s autonomy is associated with her power and agency within a household. Greater
autonomy suggests that the woman has the power to take decisions for the benefit of her health. Studies
have evaluated the effect of women’s autonomy on fertility and family planning (Abadian, 1996; Saleem and
Bobak, 2005).
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Figure 4.3 Odds Ratio of Giving Birth at Different Ages

Notes: The odds ratio are estimates from a simple discrete-time hazard model using a
standard logistic regression model that includes only a set of age dummy variables and no
intercept. The dashed lines are confidence intervals within 95 percent for the estimates.

Column (1) from Table 4.3 present the estimates for the interaction of the age
indicators with a time-invariant dummy variable indicating whether the women is
potentially eligible for JSY. It indicates that as compared to ineligible women, the odds for
eligible women to give birth at every time period are higher till the age of 19. For example,
potentially eligible women are 1.52 times as likely to have a birth at the age of 16 as
non-eligible women and the odds reduce to 0.66 at the age of 24.
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Table 4.3: Impact of JSY on Age at First Birth using Discrete Time Hazard Model
(1)
Coef

(2)
Coef

(3)
Coef

(4)
Coef

Potential Eligible* Age 15

1.707***
(0.0402)

2.015***
(0.0519)

1.835***
(0.0715)

2.107***
(0.0904)

Potential Eligible* Age 16

1.527***
(0.0272)

1.645***
(0.0332)

1.532***
(0.0448)

1.689***
(0.0561)

Potential Eligible* Age 17

1.369***
(0.0206)

1.417***
(0.0249)

1.418***
(0.0348)

1.468***
(0.0423)

Potential Eligible* Age 18

1.186***
(0.0162)

1.166***
(0.0194)

1.210***
(0.0265)

1.251***
(0.0330)

Potential Eligible* Age 19

1.008
(0.0133)

0.930***
(0.0154)

1.055*
(0.0219)

0.959
(0.0250)

Potential Eligible* Age 20

0.969*
(0.0136)

0.835***
(0.0152)

0.999
(0.0217)

0.871***
(0.0243)

Potential Eligible* Age 21

0.841***
(0.0133)

0.723***
(0.0151)

0.894***
(0.0214)

0.794***
(0.0249)

Potential Eligible* Age 22

0.786***
(0.0143)

0.698***
(0.0170)

0.790***
(0.0214)

0.707***
(0.0255)

Potential Eligible* Age 23

0.719***
(0.0154)

0.649***
(0.0188)

0.715***
(0.0222)

0.617***
(0.0260)

Potential Eligible* Age 24

0.663***
(0.0169)

0.627***
(0.0219)

0.707***
(0.0255)

0.648***
(0.0318)

Potential Eligible* Age 25

0.669***
(0.0201)

0.682***
(0.0281)

0.672***
(0.0278)

0.648***
(0.0368)

Potential Eligible* Age 26

0.589***
(0.0214)

0.616***
(0.0331)

0.643***
(0.0317)

0.633***
(0.0447)

Potential Eligible* Age 27

0.631***
(0.0278)

0.800***
(0.0517)

0.665***
(0.0390)

0.786**
(0.0654)

Potential Eligible* Age 28

0.685***
(0.0359)

0.912
(0.0722)

0.745***
(0.0522)

0.949
(0.0954)

Potential Eligible* Age 29

0.657***
(0.0409)

1.008
(0.0948)

0.679***
(0.0558)

0.908
(0.110)

Potential Eligible* Age 30

0.726***
(0.0536)

1.134
(0.130)

0.791*
(0.0773)

1.027
(0.151)
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
(1)
(2)
Coef
Coef
Potential Eligible* Age 15* Post JSY
0.696***
(0.0157)

(3)
Coef

(4)
Coef
0.738***
(0.0289)

Potential Eligible* Age 16* Post JSY

0.852***
(0.0156)

0.810***
(0.0257)

Potential Eligible* Age 17* Post JSY

0.926***
(0.0153)

0.924**
(0.0257)

Potential Eligible* Age 18* Post JSY

1.015
(0.0164)

0.928**
(0.0243)

Potential Eligible* Age 19* Post JSY

1.120***
(0.0184)

1.147***
(0.0299)

Potential Eligible* Age 20* Post JSY

1.241***
(0.0225)

1.227***
(0.0345)

Potential Eligible* Age 21* Post JSY

1.244***
(0.0262)

1.188***
(0.0381)

Potential Eligible* Age 22* Post JSY

1.185***
(0.0293)

1.156***
(0.0432)

Potential Eligible* Age 23* Post JSY

1.152***
(0.0341)

1.235***
(0.0542)

Potential Eligible* Age 24* Post JSY

1.086*
(0.0390)

1.137*
(0.0583)

Potential Eligible* Age 25* Post JSY

0.973
(0.0410)

1.030
(0.0611)

Potential Eligible* Age 26* Post JSY

0.898
(0.0506)

1.010
(0.0758)

Potential Eligible* Age 27* Post JSY

0.688***
(0.0463)

0.758**
(0.0671)

Potential Eligible* Age 28* Post JSY

0.667***
(0.0538)

0.689***
(0.0727)

Potential Eligible* Age 29* Post JSY

0.523***
(0.0505)

0.612***
(0.0777)

Potential Eligible* Age 30* Post JSY

0.578***
(0.0663)

0.698*
(0.104)

States
Observations
AIC
BIC

All
1690241
1348767.1
1357133.9
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All
1644613
1319022.4
1327567.7

HPS
761962
570209.9
574504.1

HPS
732947
553299.7
557763.6

Columns (2) and (4) report the estimates for the impact of JSY on the hazard of child
birth for potentially eligible women at each age-time period. The results suggest that after
the implementation of JSY, potentially eligible women are 30 percent more likely to not
give birth at the age of 15 compared to their ineligible counterparts. With JSY in place,
the risk of potentially eligible women to have a first birth reduces at every age period till
the age of 19 as compared to the ineligible population. The reduction in the likelihood of
having a birth is due to the beneficiaries receiving cash benefits conditioned the birth
occurs after the woman is at least 19 years old. The potentially eligible women compared
to ineligible women are 12 to 14 percent more likely to have their first child at the age of 19
after the program was implemented.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present the distribution of predicted age at first birth for
potentially eligible women. The predicted first birth ages are calculated from the model
estimated in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.3. After the implementation of JSY, the
distribution skews rightwards with the median age of first birth increasing by 0.3 years (or
3.6 months) to 18.89 years. The above results suggest that the cash benefits under JSY
incentivized eligible women to shift their first birth over the eligibility age of 19 years.
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of Age at First Birth for Potentially Eligible Women

Notes: The distribution of age at first birth for potentially eligible women is calculated by
estimating the survival functions accumulating the information on the hazard from age 15
to age of first birth. The predicted age is estimated from Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of Age at First Birth for Potentially Eligible Women (HPS)

Notes: The distribution of age at first birth for potentially eligible women is calculated by
estimating the survival functions accumulating the information on the hazard from age 15
to age of first birth. The predicted age is estimated from Table 4.3.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Discussion

My findings suggest that JSY increases the overall utilization of institutional delivery and
antenatal services. After JSSK was implemented in 2011, women in HP states shift from
home to health institutions for childbirth. This reiterates the fact the cash incentives are
insignificant compared to the overall cost of delivery care to induce significant changes in
the demand for institutional delivery. With free services under JSSK, the use of public
institutional delivery increases enough to drive wealthier women away to private healthcare
facilities. Compared to earlier studies on JSY, I document relatively smaller increases in
these outcomes. I argue that some previous studies overestimate the impact due to a
flawed definition of the treatment variable. Others fail to control for the changing
healthcare infrastructure concurrent with JSY implementation, thus the overestimated
results. Joshi and Sivaram (2014) uses a few parameters of JSY eligibility and shows a
more modest effect of the program. On the contrary, I use complete individual eligibility
criteria1 and the timing of the program to estimate the impact on healthcare utilization.
Unlike previous studies, I use several healthcare supply measures to counter the effect of
changes in demand for healthcare services due to an increased supply of services.
I also find that the movement towards institutional delivery has an impact on the
overall fetal mortality rates for the country. A portion of pregnancies that would have
1
The individual eligibility criteria used by Joshi and Sivaram (2014) does not include the condition of
women living below the poverty line, and thus, underestimated the effect.
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resulted in stillbirths due to lack of immediate care at home are now being saved during
childbirth in health facilities. I find that the fetal deaths reduced by almost 4 live births
per 1000 pregnancies after the implementation of JSY. However, after the implementation
of JSSK, institutional delivery rates increase significantly but have no impact on child
mortality rates. JSY and JSSK also increase the use of antenatal care. In addition, the
results show an interesting observation about the use of postnatal checkup by mothers.
JSY reduces the use of PNC services while JSSK increases the probability of mothers
visiting the doctor after delivery. Since this study is the first to understand the effect of
JSY eligibility on women’s age at first birth, there are no prior estimates for comparing my
results.
My results have some important policy implications. First, financial incentives act as
positive reinforcements for inducing a change in the target health behavior. The results
show that conditional cash transfers and free services lead to a significant increase in public
institutional delivery. Although various financial incentives programs are running
worldwide, JSY is one of the few programs that provides one-time direct cash assistance to
women for a particular behavior. Nepal introduced a similar CCT program, Safe Delivery
Incentive Programme, in 2005, and evidence suggests a comparable increase of 17 percent
in the utilization of in-facility delivery (Powell-Jackson and Hanson, 2012). Other
programs based on continuous payouts to households show a relatively higher impact on
the target behavior (Sosa-Rubı́ et al., 2011).
Second, although I do not study the impact of JSY and JSSK on maternal mortality
due to data limitations, the results suggest an indirect effect on maternal mortality. Direct
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obstetric causes like postpartum hemorrhage and sepsis are the leading causes of maternal
mortality in India with anemia as a contributory factor (Montgomery et al., 2014). With
the increased availability of immediate care during institutional delivery, JSY could reduce
maternal mortality. The increase in the use of antenatal care services, including regular
doctor visits and provision of iron supplements, could further reduce maternal mortality. I
find that JSY affects the pregnancy timing of eligible women. By being JSY eligible,
women shift their first birth after the age of 19 years. This could indirectly reduce the
incidence of pregnancy complications in teen pregnancies and thus, reduce teen maternal
mortality. However, the negative impact of JSY on postpartum services suggests otherwise.
I find that eligible women reduce their postnatal checkups after JSY. A shortage of care
post child delivery could result in ill health, disabilities, and deaths among women and
newborns, thus increasing the mortality rate (Li et al., 1996). Future studies could merge
maternal mortality indicators from other administrative sources to study the program’s
impact.
Third, I find a modest association between the programs and child mortality. The
lacunae in the public healthcare system could explain the results. A possibility is that the
public healthcare facilities provide sub-optimal care and fail to recognize high-risk cases,
leading to a modest decline. From the policy perspective, the program be accompanied by
higher availability and quality of care at public health institutions. Another possible
explanation is that public institutional delivery increases through a substantial decline in
the use of private institutions and not home. Thus, the effect on utilization is not large
enough to translate into better child health outcomes. The program’s targeting on merely
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institutional delivery, without nutritional and postpartum support, could also explain the
results. For example, CCT programs that significantly reduced child mortality in countries
such as Brazil (Rasella et al., 2013) and Mexico (Barham, 2011) were based on regular cash
payments to households to provide nutritional supplements to pregnant women, unlike the
one-time payment under JSY. With free services, I find a significant increase in all types of
formal healthcare services.
Fourth, the paper’s evidence on the effects of JSY on health behaviors points towards
the need for policymakers to be cautious of defining targeted groups (de Brauw and
Peterman, 2020; Sosa-Rubı́ et al., 2011). I find that the increase in public institutional
delivery due to JSY comes from a significant shift away from the private health facilities
and not home births. This suggests that the program may have failed to introduce many
women to formal maternal care. Further, the analysis of the heterogeneity of program
impact suggests that even though the program has a significant overall effect, it delivered
smaller benefits to more vulnerable groups such as women with no schooling and poor
women.
Fifth, intrafamilial decision-making power also affects women’s ability to access and
use maternal health services. Thus, the programs must be integrated with other social
schemes to increase awareness about maternal healthcare within households who play a
significant role in determining women’s healthcare choices. Future research could tap into
evaluating the impact of financial incentives on the household’s behavior.
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5.2 Conclusion

Most of the global financial incentives-based maternal care programs provide regular
payments to their target population. Their cash receipts are conditional upon a wide range
of desired health behavior. JSY stands out among these programs because it provides
one-time direct cash assistance to women for a particular behavior. It is essentially a partial
price reduction for delivering in public health institutions. Introduced in 2005, the program
uses a conditional cash transfer to incentivize the utilization of public institutional delivery.
My results suggest that the program significantly increases in-facility delivery and the
use of antenatal care. The program shifts women away from both home and private
facilities to public facilities for delivery. The decline in the use of private facilities is larger
than home births, suggesting that the program does not fully succeed in increasing the use
of formal healthcare. Instead, it leads to a greater shift within the formal options of
delivery care. Another program introduced in 2011, JSSK, provided free maternal
healthcare. It not only moved women away from homes for childbirth, but also increased
the utilization of private healthcare facilities.
JSY reduces the use of postnatal services as women substitute it with immediate
in-facility care during delivery. However, with the introduction of JSSK and free care
services, women increase their use of postnatal care services. I find no significant impact of
the programs on infant mortality. Additionally, JSY eligibility induces women to shift their
firth birth pregnancy timing to above 19 years, thus reducing teen pregnancies.
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The collective argument presented in the paper reinforces that demand-side
interventions by the government can be effective in improving the uptake of health services
but alone may be insufficient to improve health outcomes. Maternal health services must
be available, accessible, and of acceptable quality for financial incentives-based programs to
reach their full implementation potential. Moving ahead, we need to broaden our research
on JSY and JSSK to address questions around the long-term effects of financial incentives,
including changes in women’s decisions regarding the use of healthcare services outside of
maternal care. Also, the programs’ interaction with other healthcare and educational
programs must be studied to provide a holistic view of changes in women’s healthcare
behavior to different types of incentives. Finally, even if we form a consensus on the
positive effects of JSY and JSSK, studies on its cost-effectiveness are missing from the
literature. We require research on the cost-efficacy of such demand-side financing programs
for practical policy recommendations.
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APPENDIX A
Additional Tables

Table A1 Eligibility for Cash Assistance under JSY
State

Criteria

Low Performing States All pregnant women delivering in Government health centres
like Sub-centre, primary/ community health centers/ general
wards of District and state Hospitals or accredited
private institutions.
High Performing States Below Poverty Line pregnant women, aged 19 years and above.
Both States

All Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women delivering in a
government health centre like Sub-centre, primary/ community
health centers/ general wards of District and state Hospitals or
accredited private institutions.

Table A2 Limitations of Cash Assistance for Institutional Delivery
State

Criteria

Low Performing States

All births, delivered in a health centre
Private health institutions.

High Performing States

Up to 2 live births

Table A3 Cash Payments for Institutional Delivery
Rural
Woman
ASHA

Woman

Low Performing States

1400

600

1000

200

High Performing States

700

N/A

600

N/A
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Urban

ASHA

Table A4 Entitlements for pregnant women and sick newborns under JSSK
Pregnant Women
Sick newborns
Free and cashless delivery
Free C-Section
Free drugs and consumables
Free diagnostics
Free diet during stay in the health institutions
Free provision of blood
Exemption from user charges
Free transport from home to health institutions
Free transport between facilities in case
of referral
Free drop back from Institutions to home
after 48hrs stay
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Free treatment
Free drugs and consumables
Free diagnostics
Free provision of blood
Exemption from user charges
Free Transport from home to health
institutions
Free Transport between facilities in case
of referral
Free drop Back from Institutions to home.
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0.71
0.33
200,832

Immunization

Breastfeeding

Observations

133,476

0.41

0.68

0.34

0.30

0.38

0.65

0.05

0.03

0.31

0.21

0.70

153,127

0.42

0.79

0.52

0.48

0.56

0.82

0.05

0.03

0.53

0.28

0.48

182,514

0.31

0.62

0.28

0.24

0.29

0.59

0.05

0.03

0.25

0.16

0.77

136,392

0.49

0.80

0.57

0.49

0.63

0.83

0.04

0.03

0.55

0.30

0.47

Notes: The sample consists of all 35 states and 591 districts from thre rounds of the District Level Households Survey (DLHS).
* Fetal Death Rate is the number of deaths within the gestation period per 1000 pregnancies.
** Perinatal Death Rate is the number of deaths under a week including stillbirths per 1000 pregnancies.
Antenatal care includes checkup during pregnancy, tetnus injections and intake of iron supplements.

0.44

0.72

Any Antenatal Care

Postnatal Care

0.05

Perinatal Deaths∗∗

0.38

0.03

Fetal Deaths∗

First Trimester Antenatal Care

0.42

Skilled Health Professional

0.44

0.21

Delivery at Public Facility

Atleast 4 Antenatal Visits

0.60

Delivery at Home

199,474

0.27

0.62

0.29

0.24

0.27

0.60

0.05

0.03

0.26

0.15

0.76

Caste-SC/ST
Poor
LP State
Non Eligible Eligible Non Eligible Eligible Non Eligible Eligible

Table A5 Summary Statistics by Eligibility Criteria

Table A6 States Specific Summary Statistics
High Performing

Low Performing

Total

Controls
Woman’s Age
Woman’s Age at First Birth
Poor
Caste-SC/ST
Caste-General
Religion-Hindu
No Education
Village- Health Worker
Village- Distance to Facility
Village-ASHA
District- CHC per sq km

26.01
20.10
0.39
0.47
0.24
0.66
0.58
0.63
2.79
0.27
0.37

26.37
19.18
0.64
0.35
0.20
0.84
0.31
0.70
3.01
0.38
0.29

26.23
19.55
0.54
0.40
0.21
0.76
0.42
0.67
2.93
0.34
0.33

Outcomes
Delivery at Home
Delivery at Public Facility
Skilled Health Professional
Fetal Deaths∗
Perinatal Deaths∗∗
Any Antenatal Care
Atleast 4 Antenatal Visits
First Trimester Antenatal Care
Postnatal Care
Immunization
Breastfeeding

0.47
0.30
0.55
0.01
0.02
0.83
0.63
0.49
0.57
0.80
0.49

0.76
0.15
0.26
0.02
0.03
0.60
0.27
0.24
0.29
0.62
0.27

0.64
0.21
0.38
0.02
0.03
0.69
0.42
0.34
0.40
0.70
0.36

Observations

137,922

201,447

339,369

Notes: The sample consists of all 35 states and 591 districts from thre rounds of the District Level
Households Survey (DLHS).
* Fetal Death Rate is the number of deaths within the gestation period per 1000 pregnancies.
** Perinatal Death Rate is the number of deaths under a week including stillbirths per 1000
pregnancies.
Antenatal care includes checkup during pregnancy, tetnus injections and intake of iron supplements.
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Table A7 Impact of JSY on Choice of Delivery: Inclusion of Healthcare Supply
(1)
(2)
(3)
Delivery at Home
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Public Institutional Delivery
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Private Institutional Delivery
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Presence of Skilled Professional
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Supply Measure
Observations
R2

(4)

0.0106∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0238∗∗∗
(0.004)
281712
0.328

0.00797∗
(0.004)
-0.0199∗∗∗
(0.004)
279826
0.328

0.00890∗
(0.004)
-0.0217∗∗∗
(0.004)
278882
0.329

0.00658
(0.004)
-0.0179∗∗∗
(0.004)
277126
0.328

0.0279∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0443∗∗∗
(0.004)
281712
0.185

0.0314∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0393∗∗∗
(0.004)
279826
0.185

0.0298∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0425∗∗∗
(0.004)
278882
0.184

0.0330∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0373∗∗∗
(0.004)
277126
0.184

-0.0383∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.0194∗∗∗
(0.003)
281712
0.241

-0.0392∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.0183∗∗∗
(0.003)
279826
0.239

-0.0386∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.0196∗∗∗
(0.003)
278882
0.240

-0.0394∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.0184∗∗∗
(0.003)
277126
0.239

-0.00952∗
(0.004)
0.0250∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00723
(0.004)
0.0214∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00795∗
(0.004)
0.0228∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.00589
(0.004)
0.0192∗∗∗
(0.004)

None
279797
0.314

Village
277923
0.313

District
276977
0.315

Both
275233
0.314

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent different
sets of supply side health controls: no health supply (1), village-level (2), district-level (3), and
village and district-level (4). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible
for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the
years after 2005 and zero otherwise. All estimations control for age, education, wealth, caste and
religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband and birth order. District and time fixed
effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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Table A8 Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care: Inclusion of Healthcare Supply
(1)
(2)
(3)
Any Antenatal Care
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Recommended Antenatal Care
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Four Visits or More
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Second Trimester Visit
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Supply Measure
Observations
R2

(4)

-0.0106∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0455∗∗∗
(0.003)
281680
0.236

-0.00702∗
(0.003)
0.0383∗∗∗
(0.003)
279793
0.236

-0.0107∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0433∗∗∗
(0.003)
278850
0.237

-0.00710∗
(0.003)
0.0363∗∗∗
(0.003)
277093
0.237

-0.00274
(0.004)
0.00954∗
(0.004)
281878
0.298

-0.00168
(0.004)
0.00792∗
(0.004)
279990
0.297

-0.00181
(0.004)
0.00766∗
(0.004)
279044
0.298

-0.000742
(0.004)
0.00628
(0.004)
277286
0.297

-0.00242
(0.004)
0.0131∗∗∗
(0.004)
273366
0.311

-0.000899
(0.004)
0.0102∗∗
(0.004)
271509
0.309

-0.00188
(0.004)
0.0106∗∗
(0.004)
270653
0.310

-0.000305
(0.004)
0.00779∗
(0.004)
268913
0.309

-0.0350∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0780∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0299∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0682∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0353∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0769∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0303∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0673∗∗∗
(0.004)

None
291123
0.212

Village
289208
0.212

District
288212
0.213

Both
286429
0.213

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent different
sets of supply side health controls: no health supply (1), village-level (2), district-level (3), and
village and district-level (4). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible
for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the
years after 2005 and zero otherwise. All estimations control for age, education, wealth, caste and
religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband and birth order. District and time fixed
effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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Table A9 Impact of JSY on Postnatal Care: Inclusion of Healthcare Supply
(1)
(2)
(3)
Postnatal Checkup
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Breastfeeding Within Hour
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Breastfeeding Within Day
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Observations
R2
Infant Immunization
Eligible
Eligible x Post JSY
Supply Measure
Observations
R2

(4)

0.0250∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0619∗∗∗
(0.004)
271995
0.254

0.0264∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0625∗∗∗
(0.004)
270115
0.252

0.0262∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0629∗∗∗
(0.004)
269219
0.254

0.0276∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0635∗∗∗
(0.004)
267468
0.252

-0.0346∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0495∗∗∗
(0.004)
276692
0.218

-0.0321∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0454∗∗∗
(0.004)
274827
0.219

-0.0355∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0498∗∗∗
(0.004)
273872
0.219

-0.0331∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0454∗∗∗
(0.004)
272135
0.220

-0.0489∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0641∗∗∗
(0.004)
276692
0.295

-0.0455∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0576∗∗∗
(0.004)
274827
0.296

-0.0495∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0642∗∗∗
(0.004)
273872
0.296

-0.0461∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0576∗∗∗
(0.004)
272135
0.297

-0.0324∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0515∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.0263∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0396∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.0320∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0499∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.0258∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0378∗∗∗
(0.003)

None
279466
0.183

Village
277584
0.184

District
276613
0.182

Both
274860
0.183

Notes: The table presents estimates of β3 from from equation (1). The columns represent different
sets of supply side health controls: no health supply (1), village-level (2), district-level (3), and
village and district-level (4). Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible
for JSY benefits and zero otherwise. Post JSY is a time dummy variable that equals one for the
years after 2005 and zero otherwise. All estimations control for age, education, wealth, caste and
religion of woman, place of residence, education of husband and birth order. District and time fixed
effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance levels
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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(7)
Home

(8)
Govt

(9)
Pvt

0.000467 0.000662 0.000541
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
0.0147
(0.011)

-0.0131
(0.011)

-0.00318 -0.00598 0.000623
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)

0.00107
(0.009)

0.00520
(0.007)

Mean
0.441
0.317
0.234
0.441
0.317
0.234
0.441
0.316
0.234
Observations
114505 114505
114505 114505 114505 114505 114330 114330
114330
R2
0.331
0.156
0.269
0.330
0.157
0.270
0.330
0.157
0.269
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of JSY on the
choice of place of delivery in the high performing states. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for
JSY benefits and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a dummy for states
with mostly tribal population, Primary Educ is a dummy for women with more than primary education, and Poor is a dummy
for women living below the poverty line. Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence,
education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest health
facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with significance
levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Eligible x Post JSY x Poor

Eligible x Post JSY x Primary Edu

0.0610∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗ -0.0198∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008)

(6)
Pvt

0.0126 -0.0269∗∗∗ 0.00821 0.0615∗∗∗ -0.0707∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)

(5)
Govt

-0.00324 0.00640
(0.009) (0.009)

Eligible x Post JSY x Tribal

0.00179
(0.005)

-0.0161∗∗ 0.0161∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)

(4)
Home

Eligible x Post JSY

(3)
Pvt

0.0160∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0152
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)

(2)
Govt

Eligible

(1)
Home

Table A10 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Place of Delivery in HPS
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0.0126 -0.00543 0.0442∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.00447 0.00710 -0.0402∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)

-0.00642 -0.00107 -0.0122 0.0208∗
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)

Mean
0.848
0.647
0.520
0.848
0.647
0.520
0.848
0.648
0.520
Observations
114498 112369 116815 114498 112369 116815 114323 112194 116640
R2
0.237
0.242
0.167
0.237
0.242
0.168
0.237
0.244
0.169
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of JSY
on the use of antenatal care in the high performing states. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is
eligible for JSY benefits and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a
dummy for states with mostly tribal population, Primary Educ is a dummy for women with more than primary education,
and Poor is a dummy for women living below the poverty line. Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion
of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in
village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Eligible x Post JSY x Poor

Eligible x Post JSY x Primary Educ

-0.0195 -0.00832
(0.015) (0.016)

Eligible x Post JSY x Tribal

-0.0264
(0.016)

0.00654 0.00845 0.0252∗∗∗ -0.00204 0.0110
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)

Eligible x Post JSY

Table A11 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care in HPS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
ANC
Visits
Sem
ANC
Visits
Sem
ANC
Visits
Sem
Eligible
0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0150∗ -0.0254∗∗ -0.0202∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0107 -0.0248∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
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-0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0120 -0.00633
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
0.130∗∗∗
(0.012)

-0.0160 -0.0316∗∗
(0.013) (0.010)

Mean
0.446
0.504
0.801
0.446
0.504
0.801
0.446
0.503
0.802
Observations
106506 112890 113757 106506 112890 113757 106331 112716 113582
R2
0.286
0.134
0.181
0.288
0.134
0.180
0.286
0.134
0.181
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of JSY
on the use of postnatal care in the high performing states. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is
eligible for JSY benefits and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a
dummy for states with mostly tribal population, Primary Educ is a dummy for women with more than primary education,
and Poor is a dummy for women living below the poverty line. Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion
of woman, place of residence, education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in
village, and distance to the nearest health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the district level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Eligible x Post JSY x Poor

Eligible x Post JSY x Primary Educ

-0.0265
(0.015)

0.0314∗
(0.014)

Eligible x Post JSY x Tribal

0.0124
(0.017)

0.0184∗∗ -0.00946 -0.00787 0.0423∗∗∗ -0.00111 -0.00386 -0.0327∗∗∗ -0.00389 0.00488
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)

Eligible x Post JSY

Table A12 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Postnatal Care in HPS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
ANC
Visits
Sem
ANC
Visits
Sem
ANC
Visits
Sem
Eligible
-0.0193∗∗ 0.0193∗∗ 0.00338 -0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0219∗ -0.00285 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.00425 0.00401
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
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(3)
Pvt

(5)
Govt

(8)
Govt

0.152
277126
0.239

0.228
276950
0.183

0.152
276950
0.238

Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of JSY
on the choice of place of delivery. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits
and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a dummy for states with
mostly tribal population, Educ is a dummy for women with different levels of education, and Poor is a dummy for women
living below the poverty line. Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence,
education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest
health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.229
277126
0.184

0.612
276950
0.327

0.612
277126
0.327

Mean
Observations
R2

0.00127
(0.004)

0.0278∗∗∗ -0.00735 -0.0193∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)

0.0260∗
(0.013)

-0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0173
(0.013) (0.014)

Eligible x Post JSY x 12+ Years Educ

(9)
Pvt

0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0667∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)

(7)
Home

Eligible x Post JSY x Poor

0.0131
(0.012)

0.0160
(0.012)

0.0149
(0.009)

-0.0330∗∗
(0.012)

0.00576
(0.011)

-0.0232∗
(0.011)

Eligible x Post JSY x 10 Years Educ

-0.00354
(0.009)

0.00627
(0.010)

Eligible x Post JSY x 12 Years Educ

0.0181
(0.010)

-0.0510∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013)
-0.0144
(0.011)

0.152
277126
0.237

0.00590
(0.004)

(6)
Pvt

0.00322 0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
(0.005) (0.005)

Eligible x Post JSY x 8 Years Educ

0.229
277126
0.183

0.0578∗∗∗ -0.0660∗∗∗
(0.015)
(0.015)

Eligible x Post JSY x Tribal

0.612
277126
0.327

-0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)

Eligible x Post JSY
0.00451
(0.007)

0.00200
(0.004)

Eligible x Post JSY x 5 Years Educ

(4)
Home

0.0350∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.006) (0.005)

(2)
Govt

Eligible

(1)
Home

Table A13 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Place of Delivery

86

0.441
268913
0.308

0.368
286429
0.198

0.441
268737
0.308

0.367
286251
0.198

Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (2). The columns represent heterogeneous estimates of impact of
JSY on the use of antenatal care. Eligible is a binary variable that equals one if the woman is eligible for JSY benefits
and zero, otherwise. Post JSY is an indicator dummy for the implementation of JSY. Tribal is a dummy for states with
mostly tribal population, Educ is a dummy for women with different levels of education, and Poor is a dummy for women
living below the poverty line. Controls include age, education,wealth, caste and religion of woman, place of residence,
education of husband, birth order of children, presence of health worker and ASHA in village, and distance to the nearest
health facility. District and time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.

0.719
277093
0.236

0.719
276917
0.236

0.0118∗
(0.005)

Mean
Observations
R2

0.0145∗∗
(0.005)

-0.00333 -0.0311∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.009)

-0.0460∗∗∗ 0.00363 0.0976∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014)

Eligible x Post JSY x 12+ Years Educ

(9)
Timing

0.00197 -0.0181∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.005)

(8)
Visits

Eligible x Post JSY x Poor

-0.0291∗∗
(0.010)

Eligible x Post JSY x 12 Years Educ

0.368
286429
0.197

-0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0128 0.0450∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)

Eligible x Post JSY x 10 Years Educ

0.441
268913
0.308

0.0365∗∗
(0.012)

-0.0373∗∗∗ -0.0179
(0.009) (0.011)

Eligible x Post JSY x 8 Years Educ

-0.0102 0.0716∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)

0.0222
(0.015)

0.719
277093
0.235

0.0165∗∗∗
(0.003)

(7)
Any ANC

0.0113 -0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
(0.004)

-0.00697
(0.015)

-0.0115
(0.013)

-0.0557∗∗∗ -0.00548 -0.00275
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)

Eligible x Post JSY x Tribal

Eligible x Post JSY x 5 Years Educ

0.0403∗∗∗ 0.00761 0.000975 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
(0.006)

Eligible x Post JSY

0.00846
(0.006)

0.00376 -0.0120∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ 0.00383
(0.004) (0.004)
(0.005) (0.006)

-0.00398
(0.003)

(6)
Timing

(3)
(4)
Timing Any ANC

(5)
Visits

(2)
Visits

Eligible

(1)
Any ANC

Table A14 Heterogeneous Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care

APPENDIX B
Additional Figures

Figure B1 Distance to Nearest Health Facility
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Figure B2 District-wise JSY Eligible Population

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II and DLHS III
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Figure B3 Choices of Place of Delivery- High Performing States
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Figure B4 Choices of Place of Delivery by Eligibility
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Figure B5 Utilization of Public Health Facilities for JSY Eligible Women

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II and DLHS III
Notes: The change in the average utilization of institutional delivery at public health
facilities is illustrated by yellow (lowest) to green (highest). The missing districts in the
survey are white in color.
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Figure B6 Neonatal Mortality Reported by JSY Eligible Women (Pre vs Post)

1

Source: Dataset compiled using DLHS II and DLHS III
Notes: The change in the average neonatal mortality is illustrated by yellow (lowest) to
green (highest). The missing districts in the survey are white in color.
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Figure B7 Parallel Trends: Sensitivity Analysis

Notes: The estimates are from a difference-in-difference model with only pre-event years
(1999-2004). The model is a sensitivity test for the assumption of parallel trends. As per
the test, the estimated treatment effects for all pre-event years should be zero.
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Figure B8 State-wise Impact of JSY on Public Institutional Delivery

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on public institutional delivery in different states.
* denotes the union territories while the rest are states. The controls include the individual
and household characteristics, village and district-level health infrastructure. District and
time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B9 State-wise Impact of JSY on Home Births

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on home births in different states. * denotes the
union territories while the rest are states. The controls include the individual and household
characteristics, village and district-level health infrastructure. District and time fixed effects
are included.
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Figure B10 Impact of JSY on Public Institutional Delivery- Event Analysis

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on public institutional delivery in different years.
The controls include the individual and household characteristics, village and district-level
health infrastructure. District and time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B11 Impact of JSY on Home Births- Event Analysis

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on home births in different years. The controls
include the individual and household characteristics, village and district-level health
infrastructure. District and time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B12 State-wise Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on the use of any antenatal care in different states.
* denotes the union territories while the rest are states. The controls include the individual
and household characteristics, village and district-level health infrastructure. District and
time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B13 Impact of JSY on Antenatal Care- Event Analysis

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals
of the impact of the implementation of JSY on antenatal care in different years. The
controls include the individual and household characteristics, village and district-level
health infrastructure. District and time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B14 State-wise Impact of JSY on Postnatal Care

Notes: The dotted squares are the point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals of
the impact of the implementation of JSY on the use of postnatal care in different states. *
denotes the union territories while the rest are states. The controls include the individual
and household characteristics, village and district-level health infrastructure. District and
time fixed effects are included.
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Figure B15 Woman’s Age at First Birth

Notes: The dotted squares are the proportion of women with different woman’s age at first
birth. The red lines, dotted and solid, represent the eligibility age and the mean age at first
birth, respectively.
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Figure B16 Distribution of Age at First Birth for Eligible Women

Notes: The distribution of age at first birth for eligible women is calculated by estimating
the survival functions accumulating the information on the hazard from age 15 to age of first
birth. The predicted age is estimated from Table 4.3.
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Figure B17 Distribution of Age at First Birth for Eligible Women (HPS)

Notes: The distribution of age at first birth for eligible women is calculated by estimating
the survival functions accumulating the information on the hazard from age 15 to age of first
birth. The predicted age is estimated from Table 4.3.
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APPENDIX C
Discrete-Time Hazard Model
For the model, let us assume T is the woman’s age at first birth which takes values tj
such that tj = {15, 16, 17, ....30}1 . The probability of the woman giving birth at time j,
T = tj is given by
f (tj ) = fj = P r{T = tj }

The survivor function, Sj , measures the probability of the woman ’surviving’ a time period
tj by not giving birth and is given by
S(tj ) = Sj = P r{T ≥ tj } =

T
X

fj

j=15

The hazard at time tj is the conditional probability of giving birth at that time given that
woman has survived to that point such that
H(tj ) = Hj = P {T = tj |T >= j} =
=

fj
Sj

fj
(1 − H1 )(1 − H2 )....(1 − Hj−1 )

To translate the model using logistic regression, I change the discrete time hazard with
conditional odds of giving birth at each time tj such that
H(tj |X)
H0 (tj ) Xβ
=
e
(1 − H(tj |X))
1 − H0 (tj )
where H(tj |X) is the conditional hazard of giving birth at time tj based on a set of
covariates, X, and H0 (tj ) is the baseline hazard at time tj . By taking logs on both sides, we
1

Since around 99 percent of the women in the sample have had their first birth before the age of 30, I
assume that women with first births after 30 are outliers to the sample.
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get logit of the hazard of giving birth at tj given survival up to that time.
Logitλ(tj |X) = Logitλ0 (tj ) + X0 β = αj + X0 β
where the model will essentially treat time of birth as a discrete factor by introducing one
parameter αj for each possible time of birth tj .
Since I want to estimate the impact of eligibility rules of JSY program on age at first
birth, the estimated effect is a ratio of the hazard for those in the treatment group to the
hazard for those in the control group. Additionally, since the eligibility rules, by themselves,
have a component of age at first birth, the estimation results would be biased. Therefore, I
use the concept of potential eligibility for estimating the impact of JSY on woman’s age at
first birth. Potential eligibility is defined by the exogenous components of the eligibility
criteria, namely belonging to either SC/ST caste or living below the poverty line.
Logitλ(tj |X) = α(BirthTime) +

δ1 (EligibleJSY
)
i

+

2010
X

Γt (T imet )

t=2000

+
+

2010
X
t=2000
2010
X

γt (EligibleJSY
∗ T imet ) + ζ(BirthTime ∗ EligibleJSY
)
i
i

(C.1)

ηt (BirthTime ∗ T imet ∗ EligibleJSY
) + Xβ + ij
i

t=2000

where α(BirthTime) = (α1 D15 + α2 D16 + ... + α16 D30) and D15 to D30 are
age-time dummies for woman’s potential first birth age. EligibleJSY
is an indicator for
i
JSY- potentially eligible women while T imet are year dummies.
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